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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH
By
GEORGE WILLIAM DAVIS
June 7, 2020
Committee Chair: Dr. Rusty Tchernis
Major Department: Economics
This dissertation consists of three chapters on the economic determinants of health, specifically
those related to the pathways of nutrition and government nutrition assistance policy.
I evaluate the Community Eligibility Provision’s (CEP’s) effects on child weight outcomes in
my first two chapters, a program that allows certain schools to offer universally free school meals
to all students. My first chapter uses child-level data from a nationally representative survey which
follows a single sample of children from Kindergarten to fifth grade. I use these data to identify the
effect of attending a CEP school on outcomes of child weight. I find that CEP school attendance
increases a child’s Body Mass Index (BMI) percentile score, decreases their likelihood of falling
within the healthy weight range, and increases their probabilities of being overweight and obese.
In my second chapter, I utilize school-level data for the universe of K-12 schools in the state
of Georgia. My data set includes aggregate measures of child weight including average child BMI
and the percentage of students attending a school who fall within the healthy weight range. I find
that adopting the CEP decreases average child BMI and increases the percentage of healthy weight
students. Differences in the results of Chapters 1 and 2 highlight the likelihood that the CEP’s
effects on child weight may vary by location and student characteristics.
Finally, my third chapter proposes a new model for the measurement of food security. Specifi-
cally, I construct a Bayesian Graded Response Model (BGRM) which can be used to measure food
security with responses to the United States Department of Agriculture’s core Food Security Mod-
ule (FSM). I use a simulated data exercise to evaluate the performance of my model in a controlled
environment. I find that my model properly retrieves the set of data generating parameters. Com-
paring the performance of my model to the most commonly used measure of food security, the
FSM scale, I find that my model more accurately assigns the food security status of households in
all cases.
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation consists of three essays related to the economic determinants of health. The
specific goal of my work is to shed additional light on the relationship between food security, gov-
ernment nutrition assistance programs, and the health of America’s most disadvantaged residents.
My first chapter estimates the effect of the Community Eligibility Provision (CEP) on child
weight outcomes. The CEP allows schools with high percentages of disadvantaged students to
offer universally free breakfast and lunch to their entire student body. This represents a substan-
tial change from the traditional system where students were required to qualify and apply for free
and reduced-price school meals on an individual basis. Data for the study come from the Early
Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten Class of 2010-11 (ECLS-K:2011), a nationally rep-
resentative panel survey which follows a single sample of children who started Kindergarten during
the 2010-2011 school year until fifth grade. I use these data along with an external CEP data set
to identify the effect of attending a CEP school on child weight outcomes. I find that attending a
CEP school increases a child’s expected Body Mass Index (BMI) percentile score, decreases their
likelihood of falling within the healthy weight range, and increases their probability of being over-
weight and obese. I find that this relationship is nearly universal across my various specifications,
sensitivity analyses, and robustness checks.
My second chapter also seeks to answer the question of how universal free school meals affect
child weight. Like the first chapter, Chapter 2 examines the CEP’s effect on child weight, but at
a different level for a different population of students. I utilize school-level data for the universe
of K-12 schools in the state of Georgia. My data set includes aggregate measures of child weight,
namely school-level average child BMI and the percentage of students attending a school who fall
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within the healthy weight range. This approach differs from Chapter 1 where data come from
an individual level data set of only children in late elementary school at the time of the CEP’s
introduction. In Chapter 2, I find that adopting the CEP decreases school-level child BMI and in-
creases the percentage of students who fall within the healthy weight range. Differences between
the results of Chapters 1 and 2 highlight the likelihood that the CEP’s effects on child weight may
vary by characteristics like student age and location. By combining the results of multiple studies,
researchers and other interested parties can gain a better understanding of the CEP’s full effect on
child health outcomes.
Finally, my third chapter proposes a new model for the measurement of food security. Specif-
ically, I construct a Bayesian Graded Response Model (BGRM) which can be used to measure
household food security with responses to the United States Department of Agriculture’s core
Food Security Module (FSM). Unlike the most common food security measure which uses a scale
to assign households into food security categories based on their responses to the set of FSM ques-
tions, my method samples from a distribution of food security for each household and provides
several advantages over the classic approach. After deriving and presenting my model, I evaluate
its performance in a simulated data exercise. I find that the model properly retrieves the set of
data generating parameters, but similar to other studies using similar methods, convergence of the
response threshold parameters specifically is slow. Comparing the performance of my model to
that of the traditional food security scale, I show that my model does a better job classifying house-
holds as food secure or food insecure than the FSM scale when the traditional 3 positive response
criteria is used. Adjusting the number of positive responses needed to classify a household as food
insecure under the FSM scale to match the share of food insecure households in the simulated
data closes the gap in performance between the two approaches, but I still find that the BGRM
outperforms the FSM scale in all cases.
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Chapter 1
SHOULD KIDS HAVE THEIR LUNCH AND EAT IT TOO? ESTIMATING THE
EFFECT OF UNIVERSAL FREE SCHOOL MEALS ON CHILD WEIGHT
1.1 Introduction
More than half of the 44 million school meals served each day in the United States are provided
to students for free or at a reduced-price (USDA, 2017a). In keeping with the school meal pro-
gram’s earliest policy goals of preventing hunger and malnutrition among students, these Free and
Reduced-Price (FRP) meals represent an important and reliable source of food for millions of dis-
advantaged children (Gunderson, 2014). While school meals have played an important role in the
fight against food insecurity and child malnutrition for more than 80 years, room for improve-
ment exists as roughly 6.5 million U.S. children remain food insecure under the existing program
(Coleman-Jensen et al., 2018).
In an effort to reach children from disadvantaged backgrounds whose needs were not ade-
quately met through the traditional FRP system, 2010’s Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act (HHFKA)
introduced the Community Eligibility Provision (CEP). Through the CEP, qualifying schools and
districts serving high percentages of students from disadvantaged backgrounds provide free lunch
and breakfast to their entire student body. These free meals are made available to students without
consideration of their own household income level, participation in various government assistance
programs, or other related characteristics. Alternatively, students attending non-CEP schools must
qualify and apply for FRP meals on an individual basis through the traditional application–based
system. By adopting the CEP, schools remove these applications and ensure that all students can
access at least two complete meals during each school day.
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Many of the CEP’s supporters claim that the provision of universal free school meals will im-
prove student health and reduce child obesity. There are two commonly cited avenues through
which this may occur. First, students who did not participate in school meals due to cost under the
traditional system may be incentivized to switch after all meals become free. Depending on the
quality of school meals relative to a student’s alternative options, this switch may improve overall
dietary quality and health. The second avenue is the removal of stigma. More specifically, by
making school meals universally free to all students, the CEP removes the stigma surrounding free
school meals. Removal of this stigma may in turn increase participation rates and improve dietary
quality among FRP-eligible students. In contrast, some existing evidence suggests that partici-
pation in school meals may worsen, rather than improve, child weight outcomes (Schanzenbach,
2009; Millimet, Tchernis, and Husain, 2010). However, these studies evaluate the traditional sys-
tem where students self-select into FRP meals which differs from the CEP’s universal enrollment
of all students into free school meals. Furthermore, much of the existing evidence concerns the
period prior to the HHFKA’s changes to minimum meal nutrition standards. If the quality of school
meals has sufficiently improved, then the effects estimated by previous studies may not hold in the
post-HHFKA environment.
Given the substantial changes to the traditional school meal system caused by the CEP, under-
standing the provision’s effect on child health is vital to the evaluation of school meal policy. In this
study, I estimate the CEP’s effect on child weight and body composition. Child-level data come
from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten Class of 2010-11 (ECLS-K:2011)
which follows a nationally representative sample of students who started Kindergarten during the
2010-2011 school year until fifth grade. My data set includes objectively measured child height
and weight along with variables related to each student’s sociodemographic characteristics, house-
hold, and school. I utilize a panel Difference-In-Differences (DID) framework to estimate the
plausibly causal effects of attending a CEP school on my primary outcomes of interest: Body
Mass Index (BMI) percentile and the probability of underweight, healthy weight, overweight, and
obesity. Identification of my effects of interest relies on conditionally exogenous variation in CEP
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eligibility and participation as well as variation in the timing of the program’s introduction. I test
the robustness and sensitivity of my results to various sample restrictions and alternative specifica-
tions designed to address several specific threats to identification.
I find that attending a CEP school produces significant increases in a child’s expected BMI
percentile. For a 10 year old boy of average height and weight, CEP school attendance leads to a
roughly 0.5 pound increase in weight, all else unchanged. I also estimate the effect of CEP school
attendance on BMI percentile by gender, race, pre-CEP period household income level, and region.
These sub-group specific analyses allow me to determine how the CEP’s effects on weight may dif-
fer for students from different backgrounds with potentially different pre-CEP period school meal
environments. I find that attending a CEP school leads to increases in expected BMI percentile
for all sub-groups. The effect is substantially larger for girls than boys, implying that the program
produces differential impacts by gender. In line with my a priori assumptions, I also find some
evidence to suggest that children with higher pre-CEP period household income levels see larger
changes in their BMI than lower income peers. Alternatively, I do not find notable differences in
the CEP’s effect on BMI percentile by race or region.
Aside from the CEP’s direct effects on BMI percentile, my results indicate that attending a
CEP school increases a child’s likelihood of being overweight and obese while decreasing their
probability of falling within the healthy weight range. For the full sample students, I find that CEP
school attendance increases the probability of obesity by 1.41 percentage points. I find generally
similar effects in my sub-group analyses by gender, race, pre-CEP period household income level,
and region. One exception is for students living in the Northeast, where I find that attending a CEP
school increases the probability of healthy weight and decreases the probability of overweight.
My study represents a contribution to two primary literatures. First, it contributes to the litera-
ture on the effect of school meals and other government assistance programs on child weight. My
study builds on Davis and Musaddiq (2019), the study covered in Chapter 2, who use school-level
data from the state of Georgia to estimate the effect of CEP participation on average student BMI
and percent of healthy weight students. Unlike Davis and Musaddiq (2019), my data allow me
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to estimate the CEP’s effect on weight at the individual child level for the entire nation. Second,
my study contributes to the general literature on universal versus targeted government assistance
program design. Universally providing free school meals through the CEP represents a significant
departure from the traditional system in which students must qualify and apply for school meals
directly. Most notably, the CEP is a rare example of shifting the level of self-selection for an ex-
isting program upwards. By moving the free school meal enrollment decision from the child to
the school, I expect to find different effects than those observed in existing work evaluating the
traditional system.
Whether across or within socioeconomic groups, disparities in nutrition and food security
among children may lead to lifelong gaps in health, education, and economic outcomes. While
the CEP was designed to improve such inequalities, I find that it comes at the cost of potential
weight gain and increased rates of childhood overweight and obesity. With these results, policy-
makers can improve existing programs and design supplemental policies targeting children who
remain at the highest levels of poor health outcome risk in a post-CEP school meal environment.
The remainder of the study is structured as follows: Section 1.2 provides a review of the liter-
ature concerning the effect of school meals on child health, Section 1.3 gives a detailed overview
of the CEP and discusses its potential effects on student weight, Section 1.4 provides information
on data used in the study, Section 1.5 presents the study’s methodology, Section 1.6 discusses the
results of my estimation, Section 1.7 details the various tests used to evaluate the sensitivity and
robustness of my primary results, and Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
Historically, studies examining the effects of school meals on child health have produced mixed
results. Comparing children just above and below the income threshold for reduced-price lunch in
a regression discontinuity design, Schanzenbach (2009) finds that reduced-price eligible students
are more likely to be overweight relative to barely ineligible peers. Millimet, Tchernis, and Hu-
sain (2010) also find that participation in school lunch increases child weight after controlling for
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student self-selection into school breakfast. Alternatively, the authors show that school breakfast
participation leads to an expected decrease in weight, suggesting that the effects of school meals
are not necessarily homogeneous across lunch and breakfast. Capogrossi and You (2017) compare
children participating in both school lunch and school breakfast to students participating in only
one of the two programs. The authors find that school lunch participation increases a child’s prob-
ability of being overweight, especially among children living in the South, Northeast, and rural
areas of the country. Exploiting variation in the federal provision of school meal funds, Hinrichs
(2010) finds no evidence to support a long-term effect of school meal availability on adult BMI.
Finally, Gundersen, Kreider, and Pepper (2012) use a worst-case bounding model which allows
for misreporting to show that participation in school lunch significantly decreases rates of child
obesity, food insecurity, and poor health.
While many existing studies find a positive relationship between school lunch and child BMI,
participating in school breakfast is often shown to either decrease BMI or have no effect. Given that
the CEP makes lunch and breakfast universally free to all students, it is unclear what the program’s
net impact on child weight will be if the two meal types produce competing effects. In addition to
implementing the CEP, the HHKFA also mandated improvements to minimum school meal nutri-
tion standards for the first time in 15 years. Most studies looking at the relationship between school
meal participation and child weight concern the period prior to these minimum nutrition standard
changes. While meals served in CEP and non-CEP schools are subject to the same nutritional re-
quirements, it is possible that school meals have differential impacts on child weight in the pre- and
post-HHFKA periods due to variation in their average quality. Smith (2017) examines the effect
of school lunch and breakfast participation on the diets of children across the distribution of initial
diet quality in years after the HHFKA’s changes to minimum nutrition standards. The author finds
that both programs improve the diet quality of nutritionally disadvantaged children, but the effect
varies considerably depending on initial diet quality with detrimental effects for children located in
the distribution’s upper tail. This finding is especially important for my study as most CEP schools
serve a combination of disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged students. Under the assumption that
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the average diet quality of students in each group is systematically different prior to the CEP’s
introduction, I expect that offering universally free meals will have a differential impact on child
weight.
Most closely related to my study is the literature examining how alternatives to the traditional
school meal system affect child health; specifically programs where school lunch, breakfast, or a
combination of both are provided to all students for free. Schwartz and Rothbart (2017) evaluate
changes in weight caused by the switch to universal free school lunch in New York City where
breakfast had already been free to students for several years. The authors find little effect of uni-
versal free school lunch on BMI and some evidence that the change improved weight outcomes
among non-poor students.
Finally, in very first study of the CEP’s effect on child weight, Davis and Musaddiq (2019) use
school-level data from the population of K-12 schools in Georgia to show that CEP participation
leads to lower average student BMI scores and higher percentages of students falling within the
healthy weight range. While the effect differs by grade and location type, the authors find no sig-
nificant evidence to support a detrimental effect of CEP participation on measures of child weight
aggregated at the school level. This study builds on the work of Davis and Musaddiq (2019) by
using individual-level panel data from a nationally representative sample rather than school-level
data from a single state. Alternatively, my study concerns children who are in late elementary
school during the post-CEP period while Davis and Musaddiq (2019) utilize data for all K-12
schools. I discuss the differences in results and their potential causes between Chapters 1 and 2
more thoroughly in Chapter 2.
1.3 The Community Eligibility Provision
Part of 2010’s Healthy Hunger-Free Kids Act (HHFKA), the Community Eligibility Provision
(CEP) was made available to qualifying schools in all states beginning in June of 2014.1 Under the
1Prior to 2014, the CEP was piloted at different points in 11 states. Illinois, Kentucky, and Michigan were the first
states to pilot the provision during 2011; the District of Columbia, New York, Ohio, and West Virginia were added in
2012; and Florida, Georgia, Maryland, and Massachusetts became pilot states in 2013.
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CEP, schools serving a high percentage of students from disadvantaged backgrounds are given the
opportunity to provide universally free lunch and breakfast to their entire student body. Roughly
14,000 schools (1 in 10) in 2,200 districts adopted the CEP during its first year (Neuberger et al.,
2015). Among schools serving the nation’s most severely disadvantaged students, roughly 3 in 5
schools adopted the CEP.2 In its second year, around half of all CEP eligible schools in the U.S.
(18,000) adopted the provision, implying that more than 8.5 million students were attended a CEP
school in 2015 (USDA, 2016).
CEP eligibility is determined by each school’s Identified Student Percentage (ISP). ISP repre-
sents the percentage of students attending a school who are eligible for free school meals through
participation in other government assistance programs such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assis-
tance Program (SNAP) and Medicaid or by meeting other special criteria like being from a migrant
family or homeless.3 Students are identified through either direct certification, which relies on state
and federal data matching, or by a qualified school representative tasked with identifying migrant,
runaway, and homeless students.
Schools with an ISP of 40% or above are eligible to participate in the CEP. While schools play
a part in their own participation decision, school districts ultimately make the choice to enroll the
school in the provision or have them continue under the traditional system. Furthermore, if the
average ISP of schools in a district is 40% or greater, the entire district may enroll in the CEP.
Through district-wide enrollment, all schools in the district participate in the CEP. In some cases,
individually ineligible schools with ISPs below 40% participate in the CEP under this district-wide
enrollment option.
While the 40% ISP level is a strict threshold for school-level CEP eligibility, schools with ISPs
just above the eligibility threshold are the least likely to participate. The low CEP participation
rate among barely eligible schools is most likely due to how the United States Department of Agri-
2This group of schools represents those with an identified student percentage of 60% or greater. Identified student
percentage is discussed in detail in the following paragraph.
3In full, students are deemed “identified” if (i) the student’s family is a SNAP, TANF, or FDPIR recipient, (ii) the
student is a Head Start or Early Head Start participant, (iii) the student is a migrant, runaway, homeless, or foster child,
or (iv) the student is on Medicaid.
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culture (USDA) reimburses CEP schools for each meal served. Under the traditional school meal
system, every lunch and breakfast provided by the school is reimbursed at a set amount depending
on whether the student paid full price for the meal, paid a reduced price for the meal, or received
the meal for free. Full price meals earn the lowest level of reimbursement since the school re-
ceives more money directly from the child. Reduced-price meals earn a larger reimbursement than
full price meals, but free meals are reimbursed at the highest level. The amount of these reim-
bursements also varies considerably between lunch and breakfast. For example, the free lunch and
breakfast reimbursement rates during the 2016-2017 school year were $3.16 and $1.71, respec-
tively while the full price reimbursement amounts for the same meals were only $0.30 and $0.29
(USDA, 2016). Comparing full price and free rates, a full price lunch earns 9.5% of a free lunch
reimbursement and a full price breakfast earns 17%.
While FRP meals receive significantly higher reimbursements relative to full price meals, the
money students pay for each meal is assumed to largely offset the difference under the traditional
system. Alternatively, the reimbursement scheme for CEP schools is considerably different. Even
though all meals are provided to students for free under the CEP, the amount reimbursed by the
USDA varies with school ISP. More specifically, the USDA reimburses a share of 1.6× ISP of all
meals served at the free rate while the remaining (100 − 1.6 × ISP ) are reimbursed at the much
lower full price rate. In the case of a barely eligible school with an ISP of 40%, adopting the CEP
would lead to 64% of their meals being reimbursed at the free rate while the remaining 36% would
only earn the full price reimbursement. Given the substantial difference between full price and
free meal reimbursement amounts, barely eligible schools face a disincentive to CEP participation
caused by the USDA’s reimbursement system.
To see if the effect of this disincentive is supported by the data, I present the relationship be-
tween ISP and CEP participation for schools in my data set in Figure 1. Figure 1 shows bins of ISP
on the x-axis along with each bin’s corresponding CEP participation rate on the y-axis.4 The figure
4My final bin only includes schools with ISPs between 90% and 95%. There are two schools in my data set with
ISPs greater than 95%, but I remove them from the figure because their participation rate of 0.5 produces a visually
misleading change.
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shows that CEP participation fluctuates around zero among schools with ISPs below 40% with
some exceptions caused by district-wide enrollment. For schools with ISPs above the 40% cutoff,
Figure 1 shows that the CEP participation rate is increasing in ISP. Furthermore, CEP participation
is strictly increasing in ISP until the 60%-65% bin. Given that CEP schools begin receiving free
meal rate reimbursements for 100% of their meals at the 62.5% level, this change is likely caused
by removing the reimbursement disincentive from each school’s participation decision.
Aside from how ISP relates to a school’s CEP eligibility and reimbursement rate, it is important
to note that ISP differs from the percentage of students attending a school who were previously
enrolled in FRP meals. Specifically, identified students represent a subset of all students who re-
ceive meals for free or at a reduced-price (Levin and Neuberger, 2013). ISP is preferable to FRP
percentage when determining school CEP eligibility for two primary reasons. First, the CEP was
designed to satisfy the needs to children living in disadvantaged families who were not already
enrolled in FRP meals under the traditional system. These families may choose not to enroll their
child in FRP meals due to inadequate information or misunderstandings about their school meal
options. Another possible cause for non-participation is stigma, wherein children or parents do
not want to face scrutiny from their peers by utilizing FRP meals (Askelson et al., 2017). Alter-
natively, all students are enrolled in free meals under the CEP, removing the stigma surrounding
participation (USDA, 2016).
The second reason why ISP is a better fit for determining CEP eligibility than FRP percentage
relates to each measure’s relative ability to reflect student disadvantage. While FRP percentage,
namely free and reduced-price lunch percentage, is often used as a proxy for household disad-
vantage, recent research has shown that FRP percentage poorly captures disadvantage even with
respect to household income (Domina et al., 2018). ISP, however, represents the percent of stu-
dents attending a school who qualify for FRP meals through participation in a wide range of gov-
ernment assistance programs. While participation in some programs that factor into a school’s
ISP like TANF directly relate to household income, others capture additional aspects of household
disadvantage. For example, SNAP and Medicaid participation relates to a family’s reliance on
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government assistance for food and healthcare in addition to direct cash transfers.
As for the CEP’s connection to weight, I expect that attending a CEP school has the potential to
affect outcomes among three primary groups a priori. First, I anticipate an effect among children
who were ineligible for FRP meals under the traditional system. If students in this FRP-ineligible
group paid full price for school meals prior to the CEP, then the switch to free meals may not
directly change a child’s diet since the school meals they receive will remain unchanged.5 Even if
diet quality remains consistent, however, there is potential for an income effect caused by no longer
spending money on school meals. As an example of this income change, the average full price for
a lunch and breakfast served in an elementary school is $2.48 and $1.46, respectively.6 During a
180 day school year, an elementary school student paying full price for a school lunch and break-
fast each day is expected to spend roughly $710 on school meals. Following adoption of the CEP,
these same meals are provided to the student for free, thereby eliminating their cost. For a two-
person household with family income at 200% of the federal poverty line, the cost savings from
attending a CEP school amount to roughly 2.2% of their yearly household income. Depending on
how households spend this money, attending a CEP school may result in beneficial, detrimental,
or negligible changes in child weight.
Second, I expect the group of students who brought meals from home to be differentially ef-
fected by the CEP relative to children who were already participating in school meals. Students
may choose to bring “brown bag” meals under the traditional system due to their cost relative to
school meals or a preference for certain types of foods brought from home. For the first set of
students who bring brown bag meals due to cost, making school meals free through the CEP may
produce an adequate incentive to switch. These cost savings may also induce switching among
students who bring brown bag meals due to taste if their preference is outweighed by the reduction
in meal costs. In either case, I expect the CEP to have differential effects depending on the rela-
5An exception would be if enrolling in the CEP causes schools to systematically change the quality or types of
school meals they offer. While this possibility does not threaten my ability to identify the treatment effects of interest,
it would mean that the CEP’s effect on health among students participating in school meals during all periods operates
through a change in school meal quality rather than other potential mechanisms.
6Average school level meal prices come from the School Nutrition Association’s (SNA’s) State of School Nutrition
2018 survey (SNA 2018).
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tive quality of both meal types. If a child switches from higher quality brown bag meals to lower
quality school meals, their weight outcomes will most likely worsen under the CEP. If brown bag
meals are less healthy, however, then participation in school meals could have a beneficial effect
on student weight.
In addition to students who fully switch from brown bag meals to school meals following CEP
adoption, there are likely children who will continue bringing brown bag meals due to preference.
If the diet of these students is unaffected by the CEP, then I expect to see no change in their health
outcomes. This assumption would not hold if peer effects caused by the change in behavior of
students whose dietary habits were affected by the CEP leads to a change in the weight of students
who only eat food brought from home in all periods. Alternatively, it may be the case that students
bringing meals from home consume some combination of their brown bag and free school meals
under the CEP.7 If students prefer certain components of their brown bag and school meals, they
may choose to eat portions of both. This behavior has an ambiguous effect on diet quality con-
ditional on a child’s food preferences. In some cases, choosing between components of a brown
bag and school meal may have a beneficial effect on the quality of a student’s diet. If children
prefer unhealthy foods, however, I expect that having the choice to eat portions of both meals will
result in an overall increase in total calories consumed and a worsening of weight outcomes.8 In
some cases, children may even choose to eat most or all of both meals which has the potential to
substantially increase their weight.
The final group of children whose weight I expect to change after adoption of the CEP are
those who were eligible for reduced-price, but not free, meals. For the set of reduced-price eligible
students who participated in school meals prior to the CEP, I expect any change in weight to come
7In conversation with the nutrition director of a large urban school district in Georgia, I learned that many students
who brought their meals from home prior to the CEP continued to do so once free meals were made available. The
director believed this was primarily caused by the students’ distrust in the reliability of posted school meal menus
during earlier years due to one of the district’s previous food vendors. It was unclear at the time of our conversation if
students were regularly eating portions of their brown bag and free school meals rather than choosing to eat only one
of the two types.
8Aside from the affect on diet quality and health, if a child bringing brown bag meals in a CEP school eats portions
of both meals and discards the remainder, their actions will likely lead to increases in food waste. Evaluating the
CEP’s effect on the amount of food wasted in American schools is a promising avenue for future research.
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from an income effect due to cost savings or the removal of stigma. While the amount charged for
a reduced-price meal is relatively low compared to the full price, the savings may be large enough
to affect a student’s weight. Alternatively, for children who are eligible for reduced-price meals
but choose to bring brown bag meals from home under the traditional system, offering meals for
free may or may not induce changes in the ways mentioned earlier.
1.4 Data
The primary source of data for my study is the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten
Class of 2010-11 (ECLS-K:2011) restricted-use data set. The ECLS-K:2011 is a nationally rep-
resentative sample of children who began Kindergarten during the 2010-2011 school year.9 The
survey follows the same group of children from Kindergarten until fifth grade in the 2015-2016.
The survey period covers four pre-CEP years and two years of post-CEP data.10
The ECLS-K:2011 consists of multiple questionnaires administered to each child’s family,
teachers, and school administrators. Data used in my study primarily come from the family and
school questionnaires. My child weight outcomes of interest are child Body Mass Index (BMI)
percentile and binary weight category indicators of underweight, healthy weight, overweight, and
obesity.11 Unlike many similar surveys which include self-reported anthropometric outcomes,
child height and weight are directly measured by survey administrators in the ECLS-K:2011. This
feature of the data avoids concerns regarding sources of non-classical measurement error inherent
to self-reported weight and height.
I separate my covariates of interest from the ECLS-K:2011 into two sets. The first set is child
covariates which includes: If the child’s family income is at or below 200% of the federal poverty
line, if the child belongs to a single parent household, if the child’s mother was married at the
9While the ECLS-K:2011 was designed to be nationally representative for the 2010-2011 school year, the same
may not be true during later waves of the study due to attrition or demographics shifts at the national-level.
10As spoken to in Section 1.3, the CEP was piloted in 11 states prior to the 2014-2015 school year. For my primary
results, I impose the restriction that all pilot state schools were non-participants in the CEP during the pilot period.
Given that children attending pilot state schools may have been exposed to the CEP in years before the national rollout,
I expect my primary estimates to be conservative. I evaluate the impact of this restriction on my results in Section 1.7.
11All BMI percentiles and weight categories are calculated using the zanthro package in STATA.
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time of birth, child age in months, if the child is black, and if the child is male. The second set
of covariates relate to features of a child’s school, including: If the child attends an urban school,
if the child attends a rural school, and the percentage of non-white students attending the child’s
school.
To determine ISP, CEP eligibility, and CEP participation status for each school in the data set,
I rely on the restricted-use ECLS-K:2011’s Common Core of Data (CCD) identification number
to merge the set of ECLS-K:2011 schools with an external CEP data set. Since 2014 each state
has been required to submit a list to the USDA containing the CEP eligibility, CEP participation
status, and ISP of every school providing meals through the national school lunch and breakfast
programs. These data are then made publicly available by the Food Research and Action Center
(FRAC) and Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP). With the data for schools in each
state, I can identify not only which schools participated in the CEP, but their ISP and CEP eligi-
bility status. I use a self-created fuzzy string matching algorithm to merge my CEP data set with
the corresponding CCD identifiers based on school name, district name, and state.12 Following
the merger, each match was checked by hand to ensure accuracy. Finally, I merged the resulting
school CEP data set back to the ECLS-K:2011 child-level data.
Table 1 shows summary statistics for my independent and dependent variables of interest along
with the set of child and school covariates separated by eventual CEP participation status and the
pre- and post-CEP period. Overall, the average child weight outcomes and rates of good and ex-
cellent health are generally similar between both groups during the pre-CEP period. Non-CEP
schools have approximately 4 percentage points more healthy weight children, 4 percentage point
fewer overweight children, and 3 percentage point fewer obese children relative to CEP schools.
As expected, students attending CEP schools are more likely to live in a single parent household,
be born to an unmarried mother, be black, and have a household income below 200% FPL. CEP
schools are also more likely to be urban, less likely to be rural, and have higher percentages of
non-white students on average.
12All fuzzy string matching was done in Python.
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During the post-CEP period, the gap in average BMI between CEP participating and non-
participating schools widens to roughly 0.8 BMI points. While both school types see a decrease in
the average percentage of healthy weight students and an increase in the percentages of overweight
and obese students, the relative difference across the groups is larger during the post-CEP period.
Finally, to see how the averages of my health outcomes vary across time for the set of stu-
dents attending CEP and non-CEP schools, Figures 2 through 6 show unconditional trends in child
BMI and each weight category indicator for both sets of schools across time. Starting with Fig-
ure 2, I find that pre-trends in average BMI were roughly equivalent between the two groups of
schools. Figure 3 shows a considerable difference between the levels and trends of child under-
weight prevalence between the set of CEP and non-CEP schools. The magnitude of these changes
is small, however, as a relatively small number of students are underweight at any one time and
there is relatively little variation across time. In Figures 4, 5, and 6, I find similar pre-trends in
rates of healthy weight, overweight, and obesity across the set of CEP and non-CEP schools with
rates of healthy weight decreasing over time and rates of overweight and obesity increasing over
time.
1.5 Methodology
The primary effect of interest for my study is the expected change in child weight caused by at-
tending a CEP participating school. Naturally, a threat to proper identification of this effect is that
CEP eligible schools serve higher numbers of students from disadvantaged backgrounds than their
CEP ineligible counterparts. Estimating a simple regression of child weight on CEP school atten-
dance would likely produce estimates which are biased by factors common to students who attend
CEP eligible schools. More specifically, children attending CEP schools have substantially higher
individual likelihoods of belonging to single parent households, having low household incomes,
living in poorer neighborhoods, etc. Furthermore, since a school’s ISP is largely determined by the
share of students enrolled in government assistance programs, attending a CEP school increases
the probability of a child participating in these same programs. If these factors are correlated with
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CEP eligibility and child weight, then it is unlikely that estimates from a naı̈ve regression would
reflect the CEP’s causal effects on weight.
To account for these sources of potential bias in my estimates, I utilize the longitudinal structure
of the ECLS-K:2011 within a panel Difference-In-Differences framework. For child i attending
school j in year t, weight outcomes are modeled such that:
Yijt = Xijtβ + δCEPjt + αi + λt + εijt (1.1)
where Yijt is either continuous child BMI percentile or binary indicators equal to 1 if a child is
underweight, healthy weight, overweight, or obese and 0 otherwise, Xijt is a vector of child- and
school-level time varying covariates, CEPjt is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the the child’s school
participated in the CEP during year t and 0 otherwise, αi is a child-level fixed effect, λt is a year
specific fixed effect, and εijt is the model’s idiosyncratic error term.
The effect of interest in equation (1.1) is δ which shows the expected change in each weight
outcome caused by attending a CEP participating school during a post-CEP year. Since the ECLS-
K:2011 is a longitudinal study, I am able to control for sources of time-invariant heterogeneity in
each child’s weight outcomes using my child fixed effects.13 In cases where a child’s level of dis-
advantage is relatively constant across time, my child fixed effects will remove their bias from my
estimates of δ. In addition to my child fixed effects, I also control for observable covariates which
change across time. Since household income level can vary across time, I include an indicator
which is equal to 1 if a child’s household income is below 200% of the federal poverty line and
0 otherwise as a control variable in Xijt. This addition allows me to address the concern that my
primary estimates are driven by large shifts in household income which are correlated with CEP
participation rather than actual effect of CEP school attendance. Furthermore, while all students in
my sample started Kindergarten during the same year, I control for variation in weight outcomes
13It is also the case that time-invariant factors at the school level may be correlated with CEP participation and
child weight. This school-level time-invariant heterogeneity could be controlled for using school fixed effects. Since
I observe children from Kindergarten until fifth grade, however, most students attend a single school during the entire
survey period and adding school fixed effects to the model has a largely trivial effect on my results. I also show that
my results are robust to removing students who changed schools at some point from my sample in Section 1.7.
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related to differences in age by including child age in months in Xijt. I also include if a school
is Urban, if a school it Rural, and the percent of a school’s students who are non-white in Xijt
to control for potential effects of school demographic characteristics on child weight. My year
fixed effects account for potential changes in weight across time which are caused by unobserved
factors that equally affect all students at the same time. For example, the HHFKA imposed a set
of changes to minimum school meal nutrition standards prior to 2014 which took effect simultane-
ously for all schools across the country.
Estimating the causal effect of CEP school attendance on weight in my model relies on the
assumption that both the timing of the program’s introduction and each schools participation deci-
sion are independent of within-child variation in weight across time conditional on my child fixed
effects, year fixed effects, and set of control variables. There are three primary cases where this
assumption would not hold. The first is if the timing of the CEP’s introduction was in response
to differential trends in child weight among students attending CEP eligible schools. In this case,
my estimates would conflate the effect of the program’s introduction with pre-existing differences
in the change of average student weight across time. This concern is lessened by the fact that
I find generally similar unconditional pre-CEP period trends in the weight outcomes of children
attending CEP and non-CEP schools in my sample. Furthermore, since the timing of the CEP’s
introduction was set in place prior to students in my sample starting Kindergarten, it is unlikely
that relative trends in their weight would directly influence introduction timing.
The second threat is school migration in which families self-select into, or out of, CEP partici-
pating schools due to unobservable factors correlated with child weight. Given that the majority of
students in my sample do not change schools during the survey period, school migration is unlikely
to influence my results. The ECLS-K:2011 does provide information on if a child changes schools
between years as well as the reason for the move. I test the sensitivity of my results to student
migration in Section 1.7 by removing students who changed schools at any point during the survey
period from my sample.
The final threat to proper identification of δ is the possibility that a school’s CEP participation
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choice during the post-CEP period is influenced by unobserved factors which are also related to
the weight of their students. For example, if schools are more likely to adopt the CEP because the
weight of their students is growing faster than neighboring schools, then the estimated effect of
attending a CEP school may be biased by the pre-existing differences weight trajectories. I use a
number of techniques to evaluate the potential sensitivity of my estimates to bias from school-level
self-selection on unobservables in Section 1.7. First, I follow Millimet and Tchernis (2013) and
use each school’s pre-CEP period observable characteristics to construct a sub-sample which mini-
mizes the potential bias of self-selection on unobservables in my estimates of the average treatment
effect on the treated. Second, I estimate my effects of interest using various specifications of CEP
eligibility and ISP as instruments for CEP school attendance in a two-stage regression model. This
approach allows me to estimate my results using the variation in CEP participation explained by
the plausibly exogenous timing of the provision’s introduction and ISP rather than self-selection
into the program.
1.6 Results
I begin with my Difference-In-Differences (DID) estimates from the regression of child BMI per-
centile on CEP school attendance for the full sample of students. Table 2 shows the estimated
effect of attending a CEP participating school in each post-CEP period year on BMI percentile
with and without the set of child and school control variables and child fixed effects. In Column
1 of Table 2, I find that attending a CEP school increases expected BMI percentile by roughly 1.5
percentile points without child fixed effects or my set of control variables. With child and school
control variables in Column 2 and the further addition of child fixed effects in Column 3, I find
that CEP school attendance causes an expected increase in child BMI percentile of 1.35 and 1.22
percentile points, respectively. The effect is statistically significant in all cases below either the 5%
or 1% level.
To provide context for my estimates, the average BMI of children attending CEP schools dur-
ing the pre-CEP period is approximately 17.4. At an average height of 50.4 inches, an 8-year-old
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boy with a BMI of 17.4 would weigh 63 pounds. An increase of 1.5 BMI percentile points for the
same child represents a weight gain of roughly 0.5 pounds, all else equal. While the magnitude
of this effect is modest, it is important to note that my estimates capture the effect of CEP school
attendance for a maximum of two years. If the CEP produces similar effects in subsequent years,
then the program is expected to produce substantial increases in child BMI.
While I find evidence that CEP school attendance leads to an expected increase in child BMI
percentile, an important factor is how these changes in BMI relate to movements within the un-
derlying distribution of BMI, primarily at the thresholds of standardized weight categories. For
example, if CEP school attendance only increases BMI among underweight students the policy
may be thought to have an overall beneficial effect on child weight. Alternatively, if CEP school
attendance leads to increases in the probability of a child being overweight or obese, then the pro-
gram would have an overall detrimental effect on weight. I examine this relationship by regressing
indicator variables of child underweight, healthy weight, overweight, and obesity on CEP school
attendance in my DID framework.
Table 3 shows estimates for my regressions of each child weight category on CEP school atten-
dance for the full sample of students. Each regression includes year fixed effects, the set of child
and school covariates, and child fixed effects. My results suggest that each year of CEP school
attendance decreases the probability that a student falls within the healthy weight range by 1.65
percentage points. The effect is marginally statistically significant at the 10% level. For the proba-
bilities of overweight and obesity, I find that CEP school attendance leads to increases of 1.49 and
1.41 percentage points, respectively. The effect is marginally statistically significant at the 10%
level for the probability of overweight and statistically significant at the 5% level for the probabil-
ity of obesity. Alternatively, while the effect of CEP school attendance on underweight probability
is positive, it is small and statistically insignificant. While CEP school attendance may truly have
no effect on underweight probability, the lack of significance could also be the result of having so
few underweight children in my sample. Since only 3% of all students in the ECLS-K:2011 are
underweight at any given time on average, I would likely need a much larger sample size to detect
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an effect.
Given the possibility for significant increases in the percentage of students with BMIs above
the healthy weight range, my results suggest that the CEP may lead to worsened child health as
far as it relates to body composition. Furthermore, these estimates concern children who were
exposed to the CEP for a maximum of two school years.14 If students are expected to experience
similar weight increases in each year following CEP adoption, the cumulative impact of attending a
CEP school may produce substantial long-run changes in weight. Alternatively, it may be the case
that the CEP’s weight effects are temporary or that the initial weight changes stabilize following
a child’s initial exposure rather than continuing to increase BMI in a similar manner during each
year. If the effects are temporary, then the provision’s total impact on weight will likely be trivial
in the long run. If the increases in weight caused by CEP stabilize, however, then we would likely
see worsened health outcomes in the short and long run.
In addition to the effects of attending a CEP school on weight for the full sample of children,
I also evaluate how these effects vary by child characteristics. Specifically, I estimate my results
separately by gender, race, household income level during the pre-CEP period, and region. These
sub-sample results allow me to detect differences in how the CEP affects child weight for various
groups of students who likely have different pre-CEP period dietary environments.
Beginning with my results separated by gender, Table 4 shows estimates from the regression
of child BMI percentile on CEP school attendance for boys and girls. Starting with male students
in Panel A of Table 4, I find that CEP school attendance leads to small and largely statistically
insignificant changes in BMI percentile. Alternatively, looking at the results for female students
in Panel B of Table 4, my results show that attending a CEP school has a large and highly sta-
tistically significant effect on BMI percentile. With the set of child and school control variables
and child fixed effects in Column 3, each year of CEP school attendance is found to increase the
BMI percentile of girls by roughly 1.92 percentile points. This effect is both larger and statistically
different from the corresponding estimate for boys of 0.54 percentile points, implying that the CEP
14Students living in CEP pilot states may have been exposed to the program in years prior to 2014. I examine the
effect of excluding pilot state children from my sample in Section 1.7.
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does have a differential effect on child BMI by gender.
The difference between my BMI percentile results by gender may be the result of differences in
development rates between boys and girls (Rogol, Roemmich, and Clark, 2002). More specifically,
if rates of physical or mental development during childhood vary by gender, I would expect to see
differences in the effect of universal free school meals on BMI. Furthermore, it may be the case
that boys and girls face different levels of stigma surrounding free and reduced-price school meal
participation during the pre-CEP period. For example, if girls are more susceptible to the stigma of
their peers, they may be less willing to participate in free or reduced-price school meals regardless
of their availability. Following the removal of this stigma during the post-CEP period, a greater
share of girls may switch to the now socially normative free meals relative to boys. Regardless,
my estimates represent an initial evaluation of the CEP’s weight effects by gender and additional
research is needed to understand the mechanisms driving these effects.
Moving to the results of my weight category regressions by gender, Table 5 shows the effect of
CEP school attendance on probabilities of underweight, healthy weight, overweight, and obesity
for boys and girls. Beginning with boys in Panel A of Table 5, I find that attending a CEP school
produces small and statistically insignificant effects for the probability of underweight, healthy
weight, and overweight. Alternatively, the increased probability of obesity is economically sig-
nificant at roughly 1.8 percentage points, but only marginally statistically significant at the 10%
level. In Panel B of Table 5, I find that CEP school attendance leads to a substantial decrease in the
probability of healthy weight of 3.3 percentage points for girls and an increase in the probability of
overweight of 3.7 percentage points. Both effects are statistically significant below the 1% level. I
do not, however, find a significant effect for the probability of obesity. Taken together, the results
of Table 5 suggest that CEP school attendance leads to movement from the overweight to obese
range for boys. The largest change for girls, however, comes from a movement out of the healthy
weight range into the overweight range. Aside from effect magnitudes, I find that the CEP leads to
worsened child weight outcomes for both genders.
I now examine my estimates of the CEP’s effect on child weight separated by race. Because
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of differences in social and economic characteristics among children from different racial groups,
I expect to find different effects of universal free school meals on their health. To estimate these
race specific effects, I divide my sample into white and non-white students.
Table 6 shows the estimated effect of CEP school attendance on child BMI percentile by race.
For white students in Panel A of Table 6, I find that attending a CEP school leads to positive and
statistically significant changes in expected BMI percentile. With my set of control variables and
child fixed effects in Column 3, CEP school attendance is found to increase BMI percentile among
white students by 1.37 percentile points. While positive, I find smaller effects among non-white
students in Panel B of Table 6. The effect is also marginally statistically significant with the addi-
tion of my control variables and child fixed effects. Comparing the coefficients from both groups,
I do not find them to be statistically different from one another.
Table 7 shows the results from my regressions of child weight classifications by race. I find
that CEP school attendance leads to decreases in the probability of healthy weight and increases
in the probability of overweight and obesity for both groups, but the effects on healthy weight and
overweight are only marginally statistically significant for non-white students and insignificant for
white students. Similar to my BMI percentile results in Table 6, the coefficients of my weight clas-
sification regressions are not statistically different between white and non-white students. While
not statistically different, Tables 6 and 7 provide limited evidence for white students being more
effected by universal free school meals than non-white students. If white students were less likely
to qualify or enroll in free school meals prior to the CEP, then I would expect to see larger changes
in their weight following adoption of the provision. Nevertheless, additional work is needed to
determine if there is, or is not, a difference in the CEP’s weight effects by race.
I now examine my results separated by pre-CEP period household income level. More specif-
ically, I separate my sample into the set of students whose household income was below 200% of
the federal poverty line (200% FPL) at some point during the pre-CEP period and students whose
household income was never below 200% FPL. I expect children in the never below 200% FPL
group to have lower likelihoods of participating in government assistance programs during the pre-
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CEP period, implying that the introduction of free school meals may have a greater impact on their
weight outcomes. Furthermore, I expect children in the never below 200% group to have lower
rates of participation in free and reduced-price school meals during the pre-CEP period since both
the free and reduced-price school meal income eligibility thresholds are below 200% of the poverty
line under the traditional system.
Table 8 shows the results from my BMI percentile regressions by pre-CEP period household
income level. Beginning with children whose household income fell below 200% FPL at some
point during the pre-CEP period in Panel A of Table 8, I find modest and largely economically
insignificant increases in BMI percentile caused by CEP school attendance. Alternatively, I find
that attending a CEP school leads to statistically significant increases in the BMI of children who
were never below 200% FPL. These differences support my assumption that never below 200%
FPL students will see larger changes in their weight following the CEP’s introduction because they
are less likely to qualify for free and reduced-price meals under the traditional system. Comparing
the coefficients for both groups more formally, however, I do not find evidence that the effects
are statistically different from one another with any sufficient degree of certainty. Again, future
research is required to fully understand the differences in the CEP’s effect on weight by pre-CEP
period household income level.
I examine the effect of CEP school attendance on the probability of underweight, healthy
weight, overweight, and obese by pre-CEP period household income level in Table 9. The re-
sults of Table 9 suggest that the effects are similar between both groups with the CEP leading to an
increased probability of underweight, overweight, and obese, and a decreased probability of falling
within the healthy weight range. In both cases, the coefficients are statistically insignificant.
In the final set of results, I estimate my models of child BMI percentile and weight classifica-
tions separately by region. Specifically, I separate my sample into the four Census Bureau regions
of West, Midwest, South, and Northeast. Because of regional variation in social and political insti-
tutions prior to the CEP’s introduction, I expect to find differences in how CEP school attendance
affects child weight conditional on location. Furthermore, I expect the differences in CEP partici-
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pation rate across the country to impact my results as well.
Table 10 shows the DID estimates from my regressions of child BMI percentile on CEP school
attendance by region. My results suggest that there is a large degree of variation in the effect of
attending a CEP school on BMI percentile contingent on where in the country a child lives. I find
positive effects for children living in all regions, but only the coefficient for South is statistically
significant. My estimate for children living in the South is also larger in magnitude at 1.27 BMI
percentile points relative to the corresponding coefficient for the full sample of 1.22 points. Com-
paring the coefficient from my regression for Southern students to the other regions more formally,
however, I do not find statistically significant differences.
Finally, Tables 11, 12, 13, and 14 show the effects of CEP school attendance by region on the
probabilities of underweight, healthy weight, overweight, and obesity, respectively. As is the case
with my other sub-sample results, I find no evidence of a statistically significant effect of attending
a CEP school on the probability of underweight. Alternatively, Table 12 shows differences in the
CEP’s effect on the probability of healthy weight. Specifically, while I find negative effects for
students in the West, Midwest, and South, I find that CEP school attendance leads to a statistically
significant increase in the probability of healthy weight for students in the Northeast. Furthermore,
the differences between the Northeast’s effect and those of the other three regions are statistically
different from one another. I also find a negative effect of CEP school attendance on the proba-
bility of being overweight for students in the Northeast while the effect is positive for students in
the West, Midwest, and South. In Table 16, I find positive, but statistically insignificant, effects of
attending a CEP school on the probability of obesity for students in all regions.
Taken together, my BMI percentile and weight classification results by region suggest that the
increases in child BMI caused by CEP school attendance are accompanied by movements out of
the healthy weight range and into the overweight range for students in the West, Midwest, and
South. Alternatively, CEP school attendance in the Northeast leads to movement from the over-
weight range to the healthy weight range.
Some potential reasons for this regional variation are differences in socioeconomic, political,
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and demographic characteristics at the child, school, or societal level. Naturally, factors like race,
income, education, etc. are likely to vary by region, but another important difference which could
affect the impact of CEP school attendance is each region’s pre-CEP period school meal environ-
ment. Looking at related data, I do find some key differences. During the 2017-2018 school year,
schools in the South served the greatest share of FRP lunches and breakfasts at 82% of all meals
served while schools in the Midwest provided the fewest at 68%.15 Perhaps more applicable to
my study, however, is that southern schools had the highest CEP participation rate, with 45% of
all eligible schools enrolling in the provision in 2014. Given that more southern schools began
offering universal free school meals through the CEP in 2014 and that the South also serves a
highest proportion of FRP meals in years after, it seems intuitive that my primary results for the
full sample of students are driven by children attending schools in the South, masking the potential
benefits received by students in the Northeast. Evidence from future research examining the source
of these regional differences will be important to policymakers as it can illustrate which parts of
the provision should be adjusted so that it benefits students across the country rather than just those
living in the Northeast.
1.7 Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness Checks
I now test the robustness and sensitivity of my results to multiple sample restrictions and alter-
native specifications designed to correct for sources of potential bias. First, I examine the effect
that including children from pilot states has on my primary estimates. While the CEP took effect
nationally during the 2014-2015 school year, it was piloted in 11 states at different points from the
2011-2012 to 2013-2014 school year. Since data on school CEP eligibility and participation during
my sample period are only available for the 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 school years, I cannot iden-
tify the CEP eligibility or participation status of pilot schools during their state’s pilot period. In
my primary results, I assume that schools in all states were non-participants prior to 2014. While
15Data come from the Food Research and Action Center’s “State of the States: Profiles of Hunger, Poverty, and
Federal Nutrition Programs” report. The data can be downloaded directly from http://frac.org/research/resource-
library/state-of-the-states-interactive-tables.
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this assumption holds for children living in the 39 non-pilot states, students in pilot states may have
been exposed to the CEP prior to the national rollout. As an alternative to including all students,
I exclude children living in pilot states from my sample. This approach restricts my analyses to
students in states which were first exposed to the CEP during 2014.
I expect that excluding pilot state students from my sample will produce larger estimates rela-
tive to my primary results regardless of the effect’s direction. As an example, if attending a CEP
school leads to increases in child weight, including children who attended CEP schools during the
pilot period would likely bias my results downwards, providing estimates which are smaller than
the true effect. The same is true if the CEP has a beneficial effect on weight, in which case I would
also expect estimated effects to be smaller in magnitude. This may not be the case if my primary
results reflect the effect of some unobservable factor rather than the true effect of CEP school at-
tendance.
To test the impact of excluding children from pilot states, I estimate my models of child BMI
percentile and weight categories using the set of children living in the 39 non-pilot states. Table 15
shows results from regressions of child BMI percentile on CEP school attendance for this non-pilot
sample. Averaged across my specifications, I find that attending a CEP school during the post-CEP
period leads to an increase in child BMI percentile of roughly 1.68 percentile points. Each coeffi-
cient is also statistically significant below the 1% level. Compared to my results for the full sample
of children, the magnitudes of my estimates are larger after excluding pilot state students. The
difference in effect magnitudes support my assumption that including pilot state students in my
primary sample provides conservative estimates of the CEP’s effect on BMI. While larger, I do not
find the estimates for my non-pilot sub-sample regressions to be statistically different from one
another with any sufficient degree of certainty.
Table 16 shows estimates from my child weight classification regressions without pilot state
students. Like my results for BMI percentile, I find that excluding pilot state students increases
both the magnitude and level of statistical significance for my DID weight category estimates, but
the coefficients are not statistically different from those of the full sample.
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Another potential threat to my identification strategy is student migration into, or out of, CEP
schools. Specifically, if parents choose to attend or leave a school after adoption of the CEP due to
factors related to the weight of their child, my results could be biased. For example, parents may
see the CEP as a signal of poor quality and decide to migrate to a non-CEP school. If these parents
are also more likely to be concerned with their child’s weight, then I would potentially misidentify
the effect of CEP school attendance. This concern is less pressing in my study since all students
are in elementary school and generally expected to attend the same school during the entire sample
period. Regardless, I evaluate the sensitivity of my results to migration by estimating my models
of BMI percentile and weight classifications for the set of students who did not move schools at
any point during the survey period.
Table 17 shows the results from my BMI percentile regressions for the sample of students who
attended one school during the sample period. I again find that CEP school attendance leads to a
statistically significant increase in BMI percentile even after the addition of my child and school
covariates and child fixed effects. The coefficients are larger in my never moved sub-sample rela-
tive to the full sample results, but they are not statistically different from one another.
Table 18 provides coefficients from the regressions of my weight classification indicators on
CEP school attendance for the sub-sample of students who attended one school during the entire
sample period. Again, while I find larger effects from the restricted sub-sample regressions relative
to my full sample results, they are not statistically different across specifications. Taken together,
the results of Tables 17 and 18 suggest that my results are not sensitive to assumptions regarding
the self-selection of parents into or out of CEP schools.
In my primary results, I compare students across the entire available distribution of ISP to one
another. This specification implies that students attending schools with ISPs in the left tail of the
distribution are compared to students at schools towards the opposite end of the distribution. Nat-
urally, these students are not only likely to differ with respect to their probability of CEP exposure,
but also in their personal and school characteristics. While my panel data DID estimates identify
the CEP’s effects off of within-child variation, it is possible that unobserved differences between
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very low and very high ISP schools are biasing my estimates and driving the primary results.
To evaluate the sensitivity of my results to the inclusion of students attending schools located
in the tails of the ISP distribution, I restrict my sample to the interquartile range of ISP. This ap-
proach produces a sub-sample of students who attend more similar schools on average at the cost
of halving my original sample size.
Table 19 shows the results of my BMI percentile regressions for the sub-sample of students
attending schools within the ISP interquartile range. Compared to my full sample results, I find
smaller coefficients for my restricted ISP sub-sample. The estimates remain statistically signifi-
cant, with a marginally significant effect following the inclusion of my covariates and child fixed
effects. This change may be driven by the exclusion of students attending schools in the tails of
ISP, but it may also be the result of losing half my sample size. Regardless, I do not find that the
coefficients are statistically different between the restricted ISP specification and my full sample
results.
Table 20 shows the results of my weight category regressions for the set of students in my re-
stricted ISP sub-sample. Similar to my full sample results, I find that CEP school attendance leads
to increases in the probability of overweight and obese, and a decrease in the probability of healthy
weight. Unlike my full sample results, however, I do not find the effects on probability of over-
weight or obese to be statistically significant. The estimated effect of CEP school attendance on
the probability of healthy weight remains statistically significant for the restricted ISP sub-sample,
but only marginally so at the 10% level. Comparing the coefficients from Table 20 to their full
sample counterparts, I do not find that they are statistically different from one another with any
sufficient degree of certainty. Taken together, the results of Table 19 and Table 20 suggest that my
results are not entirely driven by the inclusion of students attending schools in the tails of the ISP
distribution.
For my next test, I evaluate the sensitivity of my estimates to bias from school-level self-
selection on time-variant unobservables which may influence both the CEP participation decision
and a child’s weight outcomes. My primary model assumes that the timing of the CEP’s intro-
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duction and uptake is exogenous to each child’s weight outcome trajectory. More simply, while
children attending CEP schools are likely to differ from non-CEP students in several ways, I as-
sume that the unobservable component of these differences within-child is uncorrelated with the
timing of the CEP’s introduction and each school’s participation decision conditional on my set
of fixed effects and observable control variables. This assumption is more likely to hold in my
context since children do not directly decide whether or not to participate in the CEP, but it may
be the case that CEP eligible schools take up the program because of unobservable factors related
to the weight of their students. For example, if certain schools see that the BMI of their students
is rising faster over time relative to neighboring schools, they may decide to adopt the CEP in an
effort to address the trend. The potential correlation between time-variant changes in my outcomes
and CEP participation could therefore conflate the effect of existing trends with the true effect of
CEP school attendance, leading to possible bias in my estimates.
I use two methods to address the potential bias caused by school-level self-selection on unob-
servables. First, I follow Millimet and Tchernis (2013) and restrict my sample to the set of students
that minimize the potential bias from self-selection on unobservables. I begin by collapsing my full
data set by school ID, giving me school-level averages of each variable.16 I then calculate a propen-
sity score for the probability a school ever participates in the CEP during the post-CEP period using
data from the pre-CEP period. The variables used to construct my propensity scores include the
pre-CEP period growth rates of child BMI percentile, rate of underweight, rate of healthy weight,
rate of overweight, and rate of obesity, percent of non-white students attending the school, average
student household income level, total student enrollment, if the school is in an urban area, and if
the school is in a rural area. Using the propensity score, P (Xj), for school, j, based on the set
of pre-CEP period observables, Xj , I restrict my sample to the set of students attending schools
with propensity scores in the neighborhood around P (X) = 0.5 such that P (Xj) ∈ (0.33, 0.67).
Because the bias in the average treatment effect on the treated caused by self-selection on unob-
16The ECLS-K:2011 was designed such that multiple students in the survey attended each school with an average
sample size of 23 students per-school. Therefore, aggregating my data set to the school level involves averaging the
outcomes of multiple students rather than simply using data from a single child.
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servables is minimized at P (X) = 0.5, this restriction significantly reduces the potential for error
in my estimates.
Table 21 shows the results from my BMI percentile regressions using the minimum bias (MB)
sub-sample. The results show that CEP school attendance leads to economically and statistically
significant increases in expected BMI percentile. Compared to their full sample counterparts, the
effect for my MB sub-sample are similar in both statistical significance and magnitude. One no-
table difference between the two specifications is sample size. After restricting my sample, I lose
roughly 73% of my original sample size.
Table 22 shows the results of my weight classification regressions on CEP school attendance
for children in the MB sub-sample. Like my full sample results, I find that attending a CEP school
leads to increases in the probability of underweight, overweight, and obesity, and a decreased prob-
ability of healthy weight. The MB sub-sample coefficients are also similar in magnitude to my full
sample estimates. Alternatively, I do not find the effects to be statistically significant. This lack
of significance may be due to the reduction of some bias in my estimates caused by self-selection
on unobservables, but it is likely the result of substantially reducing my sample size. Taken to-
gether, Table 21 and 22 show that the effects of CEP school attendance on my weight outcomes of
interest are qualitatively similar in magnitude and direction for the MB sub-sample and full sample.
While restricting my sample is one option for minimizing the potential bias in my results caused
by self-selection on unobservables, another is to estimate my effects of interest using the portion
of variation in CEP participation explained by the plausibly exogenous timing of the program’s in-
troduction and CEP eligibility. Specifically, I use specifications of school CEP eligibility and ISP
as instrumental variables (IVs) for CEP school attendance in two separate models. This approach
allows me to estimate the effect of attending a CEP school on my child weight outcomes using
the variation in CEP participation caused by each school’s eligibility and ISP during the post-CEP
period rather than self-selection into the provision.
I begin with a model using binary CEP eligibility as an instrument for participation. For child
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i attending school j in year t, the binary eligibility model’s first stage is given as:
CEPijt = Xijtγ + φELIGjt + α1i + λ1t + vijt (1.2)
where ELIGjt is a binary indicator equal to 1 if school j is eligible for the CEP in year t and 0
otherwise, vijt is the model’s error term, and all other variables hold the same interpretation given
in (1). Estimation of my binary eligibility model entails replacing CEPjt in (1) with the predicted
value of CEPijt from (2).
While the binary eligibility specifications allows me to identify the effect of interest using
variation caused by program eligibility and timing rather than self-selection, my instrument only
captures variation at the extensive margin of eligibility. As discussed in Section 1.3, CEP partici-
pation varies within the set of eligible schools by ISP which determines meal reimbursement rates.
To account for differences in participation caused by ISP, I also use a set of ISP interaction terms
as instruments for CEP participation. The first stage of my model using the set of ISP interactions
is given by:
CEPijt = Xijtγ + ηELIGjt ∗ ISPjt + θ(ELIGjt ∗ ISPjt)2 + α1i + λ1t + vijt (1.3)
where ELIGjt ∗ ISPjt is the interaction of school CEP eligibility status and continuous ISP and
(ELIGjt ∗ ISPjt)2 is the quadratic of the same interaction. Using the set of ISP interactions as
instruments for CEP participation allows me to account for the extensive and intensive margins of
eligibility as they relate to program participation. Furthermore, I am able to capture both linear
and non-linear features of the relationship between CEP participation and ISP among the set of
CEP eligible schools. These features give me a strong set of instruments which capture more of
the variation in CEP school attendance than simply using binary CEP eligibility. Estimation of my
model using the ISP interactions specification entails replacing the value of CEPjt in (1) with the
predicted value of CEPijt from (3).
Table 23 shows the results of my child BMI percentile regressions using binary eligibility and
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the set of ISP interactions as instruments for CEP participation.17 Under both specifications, I find
that attending a CEP school leads to a large statistically significant increase in expected BMI per-
centile. These effects are qualitatively similar to my primary results with regards to directionality,
but both coefficients are notably larger than their DID counterparts. The same holds for the IV
estimates of my weight category regressions presented in Table 24. I again find that attending a
CEP school leads to an expected decrease in the probability of healthy weight and increases in the
probability of overweight and obese under both instrument specifications. Like my BMI percentile
results, I find that the IV estimates are significantly larger than their DID equivalents. Taken to-
gether, the results of Table 23 and 24 suggest that my primary results are somewhat sensitive to
the use of instruments for CEP school attendance. However, while my IV estimates are larger
than their DID counterparts, both sets of results tell the same story – attending a CEP school leads
to non-trivial increases in expected BMI percentile and moves students out of the healthy weight
range into the overweight and obese ranges.
1.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I estimate the effect of attending a school providing universal free meals through the
Community Eligibility Provision (CEP) on child weight outcomes. To my knowledge, I am the
first to do so using individual-level child data from a nationally representative sample. Unlike the
traditional school meal system where children are required to qualify and apply for free and re-
duced price meals directly, the CEP allows schools and districts serving large numbers of students
from disadvantaged backgrounds to offer free lunch and breakfast to their entire student body. The
CEP has proven to be a popular program since its introduction in 2014 and nearly 10 million stu-
dents in the U.S. now attend a CEP school. While the introduction of universal free school meals
was meant to improve student health and reduce rates of childhood obesity, the provision’s true
effect on child weight is theoretically ambiguous. For example, students who switch from meals
brought from home to free school meals under the CEP may experience different weight effects
17While not explicitly shown here, both instrument specifications have a strong first stage with F-stats far above the
typical threshold of 10. Results can be provided upon request.
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conditional on the relative quality of both meals. Given the number of students who now attend a
CEP school and the program’s potential impacts on child weight, it is especially important that we
understand how universal free school meal availability affects student outcomes.
I use a panel Difference-In-Differences (DID) framework to estimate the effect of CEP school
attendance on several child weight outcomes. My child-level data come from the Early Childhood
Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten Class of 2010-11 (ECLS-K:2011), a longitudinal survey which
follows a nationally representative sample of students starting Kindergarten during the 2010-2011
school year until fifth grade. My weight outcomes of interest include child Body Mass Index
(BMI) percentile and binary indicators of underweight, healthy weight, overweight, and obesity. I
also estimate heterogeneous treatment effects by gender, race, pre-CEP period household income
level, and region. In addition to my primary analyses, I show that my results are generally robust
to a number of different sensitivity tests designed to address specific sources of potential bias in
my estimates.
I find that CEP school attendance increases expected child BMI percentile. My estimates for
the full sample of students suggest that CEP school attendance corresponds to a weight gain of
roughly 0.5 pounds for an 8-year-old boy of average height and weight. Looking to the effect of
CEP school attendance on the probability of child underweight, healthy weight, overweight, and
obesity, I find evidence that attending a CEP school leads to a decreased likelihood of healthy
weight and increases in the probabilities of overweight and obesity. My estimates suggest that at-
tending a CEP school decreases the probability of falling within the healthy weight range by 1.65
percentage points and increases the probability of overweight and obesity by 1.49 and 1.41 percent-
age points, respectively. In total, my results for the full sample of students suggest that attending
a CEP school not only leads to significant increases in expected BMI percentile but higher likeli-
hoods of child overweight and obesity. The CEP’s overall detrimental effects on student weight
stands in contrast to the policy’s stated goals of reducing childhood obesity and improving child
health.
In addition to my average treatment effects for the full sample of students, I examine the possi-
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bility that attending a CEP school produces different effects conditional on various child character-
istics. Looking at my results by gender, I find large statistically significant effects from attending
a CEP school on BMI percentile for girls but not boys. This difference suggests that introducing
universal free school meals leads to larger changes in the BMI of female students on average. My
child weight category regressions by gender suggest that female students are more likely to move
from the healthy weight range to the overweight range while male students only see a statistically
significant increase in the probability of obesity following adoption of the CEP.
Separated by race, I find that CEP school attendance leads to increases in child BMI percentile
for both white and non-white students, with larger and more consistently significant effects for
white students. Similar to my full sample results, I find that CEP school attendance leads to an
increase in the probabilities of overweight and obesity for white and non-white students and a de-
crease in the probability of healthy weight. I do not, however, find the coefficients to be statistically
different between both groups.
Looking at my results separated by pre-CEP period household income level, I find positive
effects for children whose household income was never below 200% of the federal poverty line
(200% FPL) and children whose household income was below 200% FPL at some point during the
same period. My coefficients are larger in magnitude and more consistently statistically significant
for children who never fell below 200% FPL. This difference supports my assumption that students
with higher family incomes are more likely to see larger changes in weight following the introduc-
tion of universal free school meals. I again find that attending a CEP school leads to increases
in the probability of overweight and obese and a decrease in the probability of falling within the
healthy weight range, but the coefficients are statistically insignificant for both groups.
Separating my BMI percentile results by region, I find universally positive effects for students
in the West, Midwest, South, and Northeast, but the effect is only statistically significant for stu-
dents in the South. Looking to my child weight classification regressions by region, I find positive
effects from the CEP on the probability of overweight and obesity and a negative effect on the
probability of healthy weight for students in the West, Midwest, and South. Alternatively, I find
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that attending a CEP school leads to a statistically significant increase in the probability of falling
within the healthy weight range and a decrease in the probability of being overweight for students
in the Northeast. This is the only evidence of a beneficial effect from the CEP on child weight
across all of my various specifications.
My results differ from those of Davis and Musaddiq (2019) who find that CEP participation
decreases school-level average child BMI and increases the percentage of a school’s students who
fall within the healthy weight range. There are three potential reasons for this discrepancy. First,
rather than relying on school-level averages, my data are at the individual child-level. While I
largely find that attending a CEP school causes expected increases in BMI percentile and the prob-
ability of poor weight outcomes, the provision’s aggregate effects could be negative if a sufficient
number of students see a decrease in weight from the CEP. Second, Davis and Musaddiq (2019)
use data from all K-12 schools while my data set only includes children in elementary school. If
the effect of CEP participation on weight varies by child age, the aggregate effect of CEP school at-
tendance may be different for the set of all K-12 schools than. Finally, Davis and Musaddiq (2019)
examine the population of schools in Georgia while my sample includes children from nearly every
state in the country. My regional analyses suggest that there is a considerable degree of variation in
the effect of attending a CEP school by location. While it may be that the CEP improves average
child weight outcomes in Georgia, the same may not be true in other areas. Unfortunately, I can-
not recreate the authors’ analyses since the ECLS-K:2011 does not include children from Georgia
who attend a CEP school during the post-CEP period. These differences and their implications are
covered more thoroughly in the following chapter.
While I find evidence to suggest that CEP participation comes at the cost of potentially wors-
ened child weight outcomes among elementary school students, the program may still lead to an
over all improvement in child health. Future work examining non-weight related health outcomes
is needed. There is also significant room for work evaluating the CEP’s impact on mental health
outcomes at the child- and parent-level. If the CEP effectively removes stigma surrounding free
and reduced-price meal participation and reduces rates or food insecurity, the program may pro-
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duce improvements in mental health which are not reflected in its effects on weight. Furthermore,
my study includes data covering two years after the CEP’s national rollout. Future work focusing
on the CEP’s health effects across time will provide much needed information regarding the pro-
vision’s long-run effects. Additional research is also needed to show how CEP school attendance
affects individual child health for students of all ages. While I find that the CEP leads to detrimen-
tal weight changes, my effects only concern children in the final two years of elementary school.
Finally, a combination of further quantitative and qualitative research is needed to determine
the pathways through which CEP school attendance affects child health. If the nutritional quality
of school meals are driving my findings, then improvements in minimum nutrition requirements
may eliminate or reverse the CEP’s weight effects. Alternatively, if children attending CEP schools
are eating both meals brought from home as well as their free school meals each day, steps could
be taken to inform families and prevent substantive increases in calories consumed following the
switch to CEP. I also show initial evidence for heterogeneous effects by various child characteris-
tics. Examining the causes of these differences is a promising avenue for future research. Regard-
less of the mechanisms underlying my results, studies evaluating both the impacts and pathways
through which universal free school meals affect child health are required to properly evaluate
existing and future school meal policies.
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Chapter 2
ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF UNIVERSAL FREE SCHOOL MEAL
ENROLLMENT ON CHILD WEIGHT: EVIDENCE FROM THE COMMUNITY
ELIGIBILITY PROVISION IN GEORGIA SCHOOLS
Note: This chapter represents coauthored work with my colleague, Tareena Musaddiq. Addition-
ally, Chapter 2 does not include the literature review and policy sections found in the initial study
since they are covered in Chapter 1.
2.1 Introduction
During each academic year, children in the United States recieve between one-third and one-half of
their daily calories from meals eaten in school (Schanzenbach, 2009, Briefel et al., 2009). The ma-
jority of these meals come from subsidized school meal programs like the National School Lunch
Program (NSLP) and School Breakfast Program (SBP). The NSLP alone is the nation’s second
largest nutrition assistance program and provides school lunch in 95 percent of public schools at
an annual cost of $13.6 billion dollars (FRAC, 2017). Both the NSLP and SBP also offer school
meals at a free or reduced-price to students from low-income households. Of the 44.6 million chil-
dren who participated in school meals during 2016, roughly 75 percent received meals either for
free or at a reduced price (USDA, 2017a, USDA, 2017b). These school meals represent a critical
source of nutritious and consistently available food for many of the nation’s disadvantaged chil-
dren. For the most at-risk students, school meals may make the difference between going hungry
and having the food necessary for successful learning and development (NKH, 2017).
As discussed in Chapter 1, the Healthy Hunger Free Kids Act’s (HHFKA’s) Community Eligi-
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bility Provision (CEP) led to a considerable change in how America’s low-income schools provide
meals to their students. In this study, we estimate the CEP’s effect on school-level aggregate
measures of child weight among the population of K-12 schools in the state of Georgia. More
specifically, we estimate models of school-level student weight outcomes using different specifica-
tions of CEP eligibility as instruments for CEP participation. Our approach allows us to estimate
plausibly causal effects of providing universal free meals to students in public schools on aggregate
weight measures. We provide separate estimates for the full sample of K-12 schools, elementary
schools, middle schools, and high schools. We also estimate our results separately for schools in
urban areas, rural areas, and suburbs/towns in Georgia.
Our results suggest that CEP participation increases the percentage of students who fall within
the healthy weight range and reduces average Body Mass Index (BMI) scores for K-12 schools
in the state of Georgia. This stands in contrast to my findings in Chapter 1 and those of some
other studies that find free and reduced-price school meals provided under the traditional system
lead to worsened weight outcomes. We find no statistically significant evidence of similar changes
following CEP participation. We find that CEP participation is expected to increase the number of
healthy weight students attending a school by 13 for the full sample and decrease average BMI by
approximately 1 percentage point. Looking at our results by grade type, we do not find statistically
significant effects on the aggregate weight outcomes of high schools, implying that CEP participa-
tion leads to smaller changes in the average weight outcomes of schools serving older children.
We also find that CEP participation leads to statistically significant increases in the percentage
of healthy weight students attending urban and rural schools, but we do not find significant impacts
on the healthy weight percentage of schools located in suburbs and towns. Furthermore, while ru-
ral schools are located in Georgia’s poorest counties and provide the fewest free and reduced-price
meals during the pre-CEP period, urban schools are far more likely to participate in the CEP con-
ditional on eligibility. This runs contrary to the CEP’s primary goal of targeting schools where
students were inadequately covered by the existing free and reduced-price meal system. Given
the potentially beneficial weight effects of CEP participation found in our results, differences in
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take-up by location type may create or worsen area-level child health disparities in Georgia if the
CEP cannot be made effective, feasible, and attractive to all schools.
Comparing this study to the study presented in Chapter 1 highlights interesting similarities and
differences. First, both studies estimate the CEP’s effect on child weight, but at different levels and
for different groups of students. While the estimates of Chapter 1 come from a nationally represen-
tative sample of students in late elementary school, this study uses data from the universe of K-12
schools in Georgia. Therefore, while Chapter 1 is likely to have greater external validity, Chapter
2 covers students of different ages at all schools in one state. These differences affect what can be
learned from each study, a topic I will cover in more detail later in this chapter, but comparing the
results of Chapter 1 and 2 highlights the potential differences in how the CEP affects child weight
for students of different ages in different areas of the country.
2.2 Data
Our study utilizes several sources of data from K-12 schools in Georgia over the 2011-2012 to
2016-2017 school years. The data set contains variables related to school-level average child
weight outcomes, Identified Student Percentage (ISP), CEP participation and eligibility, and stu-
dent sociodemographic characteristics. Data on weight outcomes come from the FitnessGram.
Each year, physical education instructors in Georgia public schools are required to administer the
FitnessGram; a collection of tests which measure the physical fitness, height, and weight of stu-
dents attending each school. FitnessGram data aggregated at the school-level are publicly available
for our sample period through the Georgia Department of Education (GaDOE).1 Our primary out-
comes of interest from the FitnessGram relate to child body composition, namely average child
Body Mass Index (BMI) score and the percentage of children who are of a healthy weight.
Unlike the child-level data used in Chapter 1 which could be used to calculate child BMI per-
centile, changes in BMI at the school-level are difficult to interpret and compare across schools
1Data can be found on the GaDOE website for the 2011-2012, 2012-2013, 2013-2014, and 2014-2015 school
years: http://www.gadoe.org/Pages/Home.aspx. Data for the 2015-2016 and 2016-2017 school years were obtained
through an open data request.
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serving children of different ages. One contributing reason is that only observing a change in the
mean provides no information as to where in the weight distribution the change is taking place.
For example, obese or underweight children losing weight can cause an identical decrease in mean
BMI with obviously different implications for overall student health. The second issue is that child
BMI score interpretations vary considerably by age and gender.
To remove some of this ambiguity, we primarily focus on another FitnessGram variable show-
ing the percentage of children at each school who fall “In the Healthy Fitness Zone” (InHFZ%) for
BMI. A child is considered in the BMI healthy fitness zone if their score falls within the 5th and
85th percentile range for their age and gender as determined by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC).2 Therefore, InHFZ% is equivalent to the percentage of healthy weight chil-
dren attending a school. Unlike mean BMI, changes to InHFZ% have direct implications for child
health. An increase (decrease) in InHFZ% relates to an improvement (worsening) of school-level
health regardless of where in the weight distribution the change occurs. Going one step further,
the combination of changes to mean BMI and InHFZ% suggests additional information. If mean
BMI decreases and InHFZ% increases, then the dominant change in weight likely comes from
overweight or obese children losing weight and moving into the healthy weight range. This in-
terpretation does not rule out the possibility of concurrent weight changes elsewhere in the BMI
distribution, but it does allow us to identify probable locations of a change.
Similar to Chapter 1, we collect CEP data for the 2014-2016 school years from the Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) who gathers and provides the data in a joint effort with the
Food Research and Action Center (FRAC).3 The USDA began requiring that each state submit a
list containing the CEP eligibility, participation status, and ISP of all applicable schools and dis-
tricts in 2014. Unfortunately, even though Georgia was a CEP pilot state during the 2013-2014
school year, information is only available for the 2014-2015 school year onward. To account for
this limitation, the 2013-2014 school year is excluded from our primary analysis. We test the sen-
2See Plowman and Meredith, 2013.
3Data are available through the CBPP’s website: https://www.cbpp.org.
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sitivity of our results to this assumption in Section 2.5.4
Data used to identify each school’s location type come from the National Center for Educa-
tion Statistics’ (NCES’) Common Core of Data (CCD).5 Schools are categorized as either urban,
rural, or suburb/town. We also collect school-level revenue, expenditure, and student sociodemo-
graphic data for the entire analysis period through the Governor’s Office of Student Achievement
(GOSA).6 Finally, county-level data on poverty percentages by age range and median household
income for each year come from the Census Bureau’s Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates
(SAIPE) program.
Summary statistics for the dependent variables of interest, independent variables of interest,
and control variables are presented in Table 25. As Table 25 shows, the mean BMI for schools in
our sample is approximately 20.35. Unlike adult BMI which has a consistent interpretation across
age and gender, a child BMI score of 20.35 falls within the obese weight range for a six-year-old
boy and the healthy weight range for a 14-year-old boy. As an alternative view of child weight, our
InHFZ% variable shows that roughly 58.88% of Georgia students fall within the healthy weight
range during the sample period, implying that 41.12% of children are some combination of un-
derweight, overweight, and obese. Our “Ever CEP Eligible” variable shows that roughly 47% of
Georgia’s K-12 schools were eligible for the CEP at some point during the 2014-2015 to 2016-
2017 period. Our “Ever CEP Participating” variable indicates that approximately 26.87% of all
schools participated in the CEP at some point during the same period, giving us a CEP take-up
rate of roughly 57% among eligible schools. Our “ISP if CEP Eligible” variable shows that the
average ISP of CEP eligible schools is roughly 55.96%. Alternatively, our “ISP if CEP Partici-
pant” variable shows that the average ISP for schools that participate in the CEP is roughly 60%,
further suggesting a positive correlation between ISP and the CEP participation rate. The final set
4Removing Georgia’s CEP pilot period from the sample differs from the approach taken in Chapter 1. In Chapter 1,
I had nationally representative data from students in nearly all states. Given that only 11 states had CEP pilot periods,
the majority of my states and students did not had the CEP until the national rollout in 2014-2015. Alternatively,
Chapter 2 uses data only from the state of Georgia in which case all schools had a pilot state period, making the threat
to identification caused by leaving in 2013-2014 more acute. Regardless, I test both the sensitivity of my results to the
inclusion/exclusion of the pilot state period observations in both chapters.
5Data are available directly through the CCD website: https://nces.ed.gov/ccd/pubschuniv.asp.
6Data are available directly from the GOSA website: https://gosa.georgia.gov/downloadable-data.
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of control variables used in our analyses include: Percent Black Students, Percent White Students,
Percent Migrant Students, Percent Special Education Students, Percent English as a Second Lan-
guage (ESL) Students, and Percent Gifted Students.
Figures 8 and 9 provide graphical illustrations of the across-year change in InHFZ% and mean
BMI for the group of ever CEP eligible and never CEP eligible schools. Figure 8 shows that there
is a considerable difference between the average InHFZ% of never CEP eligible and ever CEP eli-
gible schools, with the never eligible group having a higher average percentage of healthy weight
students in all years. We also see that the InHFZ% of both groups increased non-trivially beginning
in the 2015-2016 school year. The bulk of this increase is due to a widening of the CDC’s healthy
weight thresholds in 2015 which lead to a greater number of children falling within the 5th-85th
percentile range. Since this change to InHFZ% affects all students and schools simultaneously,
any impact of the measurement change on our results should be removed through the use of year
fixed effects. We test this assumption explicitly in Section 2.5.7
Finally, Figure 9 shows us that the average BMI of ever CEP eligible schools is higher than
that of never eligible schools during both the 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 school years. The aver-
age BMI of both groups saw comparable decreases during this period, suggesting that both sets of
schools had similar pre-trends in child weight during our two pre-CEP periods. The reason for this
decrease may be due to improvements in school meal minimum nutrition standards caused by the
HHFKA directly before and during the pre-CEP period. Interestingly, the average BMI level of
CEP eligible schools begins to fall below that of never eligible schools starting in the 2013-2014
school year which is when Georgia implemented the provision as a pilot state prior to the na-
tional roll-out in 2014-2015. The average BMI of both school types continues to decrease during
2014-2015 and 2015-2016, but increases in 2016-2017 to roughly their 2014-2015 levels.
7One case where the healthy weight threshold change would bias our analyses is if either the CEP eligible or CEP
ineligible group of schools had a disproportionate number of students with BMIs just outside the pre-2015 healthy
weight range, implying that more students would fall within the new threshold relative to the other group of schools.
To test this, we estimate our primary results for InHFZ% excluding the 2015-2016 and 2016-2017 school years. We
do not find that this fundamentally changes our results.
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2.3 Methodology
To eliminate potential biases caused by the self-selection of schools into the CEP, we use two differ-
ent specifications of CEP eligibility as instrumental variables for CEP participation in a two-stage
linear regression model. Unlike Chapter 1 where students did not directly make the CEP participa-
tion choice, the threat to identification from self-selection on unobservables is much more salient
when using school-level data. Therefore, we focus on an IV approach rather than a difference-in-
differences approach.8
We begin with a model using binary CEP eligibility as an instrument for CEP participation.
The first stage of our model under the binary eligibility specification for school i in year t is given
by:
CEPit = Zitγ + φELIGit + αi1 + λt1 + vit (2.1)
where CEPit is equal to 1 if school i participates in the CEP during year t and 0 otherwise, Zit is a
vector of time-variant control variables,ELIGit is a binary variable equal to 1 if school i is eligible
to participate in the CEP during year t and 0 otherwise, αi1 captures school-level sources of time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity, λt1 captures year-level sources of unobserved heterogeneity,
and vit is the model’s normally distributed idiosyncratic error term. The primary effect of interest
in equation (2.1) is φ which gives us the estimated effect of being CEP eligible on a school’s
probability of participating in the CEP during the same year, all else unchanged.
The binary eligibility specification above predicts CEP participation using plausibly exogenous
variation in program timing and eligibility rather than other unobserved factors affecting self-
8As discussed in more detail in Chapter 1, CEP eligibility is technically determined by a discontinuity in ISP
at 40%, implying that a regression discontinuity (RD) design would seem like a natural approach for our analyses.
Unfortunately, using an RD model is not well suited in this context. This is because few schools with ISPs just at or
above the 40% level participate in the CEP due to USDA’s meal reimbursement rates. The inverse relationship between
ISP and reimbursements combined with our limited sample size gives us too few CEP participating schools just above
the threshold to precisely estimate an RD with school-level data from only one state. Furthermore, variation in our
weight outcomes at the eligibility threshold is driven by the underlying CEP participation rate. Since the set of barely
eligible schools for which the the barriers to participation do not prevent enrolling in the provision are likely different
from the average school just below the eligibility threshold, this may lead to improper estimates of the treatment effect.
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selection. The primary assumption supporting the validity of this approach is that, conditional on
our control variables and set of fixed effects, the timing of the CEP’s introduction is independent
from changes in student characteristics that our correlated to our weight outcomes of interest.9
However, our binary specification only considers the extensive margin of CEP eligibility. The
assumption that CEP participation in a certain year depends solely on a school’s eligibility status
abstracts from the non-linear relationship between CEP participation and ISP discussed in Chapter
1.
In order to allow CEP participation to vary non-linearly with CEP eligibility and ISP, we also
use an alternative specification in our model’s first stage such that for school i in year t:
CEPit = Zitγ + φ(100− ISPit) ∗ ELIGit + η((100− ISPit) ∗ ELIGit)2 + αi1 + λt1 + vit
(2.2)
where ISPit is the Identified Student Percentage (ISP) of school i in year t and all other terms
hold the same definition they are assigned in equation (2.1). In addition to isolating the variance
in CEP participation caused by eligibility, the specification given by equation (2.2) captures two
features present in the relationship between ISP and CEP participation. First, the effect of CEP
eligibility on participation is allowed to vary linearly with its running variable, ISP. Second, our
ISP interaction specification allows for a non-linear effect of CEP eligibility interacted with ISP
on CEP participation. With this feature, increases in ISP among CEP eligible schools may raise or
lower the probability of participation depending on a school’s initial identified student percentage.
In our model’s second stage, we utilize the variation in CEP participation caused by CEP
eligibility and ISP using one of the two first stage specifications discussed above to construct
instrumental variable estimates of CEP participation’s effect on school-level weight such that for
school i in year t:
Yit = Zitβ + δCEPit + αi2 + λt2 + eit (2.3)
9We test the validity of this assumption in Section 2.5 using a pre-CEP period placebo test.
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where Yit is either InHFZ% or average BMI, CEPit is CEP participation, and all other variables
hold the same interpretation given in (2.1) and (2.2). Estimation of (2.3) involves replacing CEP
participation with its predicted value from our first stage regression using either the binary eligi-
bility or ISP interaction specification given by equations (2.1) and (2.2), respectively.
The primary coefficient of interest in (2.3) is δ which represents the expected change in In-
HFZ% and average BMI caused by CEP participation conditional on the model’s other covariates.
Consistent estimation of δ faces two primary challenges. The first problem which was mentioned
above is the potential for bias caused by self-selection into the CEP based on unobservable factors
related to student health. More succinctly, if CEP eligible schools participate in the provision be-
cause of unobserved factors that also affect the weight of their students, then our estimates of δ will
be inconsistent. We address this concern by instrumenting for CEP participation using our specifi-
cations of CEP eligibility. This approach allows us to estimate our effect of interest in our model’s
second stage using variation in CEP participation caused by timing of the CEP’s introduction and
eligibility for the provision rather than the set of unobservables determining self-selection. We test
this assumption more thoroughly in Section 2.5.
The second challenge to consistent identification of δ is that CEP eligibility is determined by
ISP, implying that CEP eligible schools necessarily serve a greater number of disadvantaged stu-
dents who are enrolled in government assistance programs during all periods. Since our outcome
of interest is at the school-level, we are able to make two reasonable assumptions to control for
the effect of these programs on weight using school and year fixed effects. Our first assumption is
that the proportion of students participating in government assistance programs changes relatively
little for each school over our sample period. Under this assumption, we are able to isolate the
effect of CEP participation on our aggregate weight outcomes net of time-invariant differences in
student government assistance program participation using school fixed effects. Furthermore, we
use year fixed effects to control for potential variation in government assistance program partici-
pation rates caused by any national or state level changes which simultaneously affect all schools
in our sample.
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2.4 Results
We use two different instrumental variable (IV) specifications in our model’s first stage to produce
our primary results.10 First, we use a binary indicator of CEP eligibility during each post-CEP
school year as an instrument for CEP participation. Panel A of Table 26 shows the estimated effect
of this binary eligibility instrument on CEP participation from our model’s first stage for the full
sample of schools along with separate estimates for elementary schools, middle schools, and high
schools. We find that CEP eligibility is highly predictive of CEP participation with coefficients that
are statistically significant below the 1% level for the full sample of schools and all grade types.
Being eligible for the CEP during the post-CEP period increases the likelihood of participation by
roughly 46.7 percentage points for the full sample of schools conditional on our set of control vari-
ables, school fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Looking at the results of our first specification
by grade type, we find that CEP eligibility has the smallest effect on CEP participation among ele-
mentary schools at 41.7 percentage points compared to 52.5 and 60.5 percentage points for middle
and high schools, respectively.
In the second specification of our model’s first stage, we instrument for CEP participation using
(100-ISP) interacted with the binary CEP eligibility indicator from our first specification. We also
include the square of the same term to account for nonlinear effects. Specifically, this specification
allows us to capture nonlinearities in the effect of CEP eligibility and its running variable, ISP,
on CEP participation which are discussed in Chapter 1. Panel B of Table 26 shows our first stage
estimates under the ISP interaction specification for the full sample of schools along with separate
estimates for elementary, middle, and high schools. For the full sample of schools, the positive
coefficient on our ISP interaction combined with the negative coefficient on the squared interac-
tion term imply that the probability of CEP participation is initially increasing in ISP, but at a point
the effect becomes negative. The turnaround point for our full sample occurs at a (100-ISP) of 29
which corresponds to an ISP of roughly 71%. At an average ISP of 56% for CEP eligible schools, a
10Since our analyses are at the school-level, we weight all regressions by school student population in the 2014-2015
school year. Estimates our models using student population in 2015-2016 or 2016-2017 as regression weights does
not fundamentally change our results.
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1 percentage point increase in ISP would lead to a 3.13 percentage point increase in the probability
of CEP participation. Similar to the case with our binary CEP eligibility specification, we find that
the effect of our ISP interaction instruments on CEP participation is smaller for elementary schools
relative to both middle and high schools. The F-stat of each regression shows that our instruments
are well powered to estimate the effects of interest in our model’s second stage.
We use the specifications above to estimate the impact of CEP participation on two outcomes of
interest: the percent of students attending a school who are of a healthy weight (InHFZ%) and aver-
age school-level BMI. Beginning with our binary CEP eligibility specification, Table 27 shows the
estimated effects of CEP participation on InHFZ% and average BMI for the full sample of schools
as well as separately for elementary schools, middle schools, and high schools. Beginning with the
full sample of schools in Panel A of Table 27, we find that CEP participation leads to a statistically
significant increase in the percentage of healthy weight children attending a school of roughly 1.8
percentage points relative to non-participating schools. At the average student population of 719
and average InHFZ% of 58.8% among the set of CEP eligible schools, our binary specification
results suggest that participation in the CEP is expected to increase the number of healthy weight
students attending a school by 13. Looking at our binary specification results by grade type, we
see that CEP participation leads to positive effects on the InHFZ% of elementary, middle, and high
schools. While, the coefficients are statistically insignificant for each of the three grade types. The
lack of statistical significance for our results by grade type is potentially caused by the reduction in
sample size, but it may also be the case that CEP participation only leads to more healthy weight
children at the aggregate K-12 level.
Panel B of Table 27 shows the estimated effect of CEP participation on average BMI using
our binary CEP specification. We find that CEP participation leads to a statistically significant
decrease of 0.197 BMI points in school average BMI for the full sample of K-12 schools. Looking
at our results by grade type, we find that CEP participation leads to lower average BMI scores for
elementary, middle, and high schools, but the effect is only statistically significant for elementary
schools.
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Moving now to the primary results of the model using our ISP interaction terms as instruments
for CEP participation, Table 28 shows the estimated effect of CEP participation on InHFZ% and
average BMI for the full sample of schools as well as by school grade type. Beginning with Panel A
of Table 28, we find that CEP participation leads to a statistically significant increase in a school’s
expected percentage of healthy weight students of around 1.3 percentage points for the full sample
of schools. While smaller than the effect we find under the binary eligibility specification, our re-
sults indicate that CEP participation is expected to increase the number of healthy weight students
attending an average CEP eligible school by 9. Examining our results by school grade type, we
find that CEP participation leads to a statistically significant 2.29 percentage point increase in the
InHFZ% of middle schools. The average middle school size and InHFZ% among CEP eligible
schools is 796.4 and 53.66% respectively, implying that participating in the CEP is expected to
increase the number of healthy weight students attending an average CEP eligible middle school
by roughly 18 students. While positive, the effect of CEP participation on InHFZ% is statistically
insignificant for elementary schools under our ISP interaction specification. Alternatively, the ef-
fect for high schools is found to be negative under our ISP interaction specification, but the effect
is close to zero with a relatively large standard error.
Looking at Panel B of Table 28, we find that CEP participation is expected to reduce a school’s
average BMI by roughly 0.1 BMI points for the full sample of schools under our ISP specifica-
tion. While statistically significant and positive, using our ISP interaction terms as instruments for
CEP participation gives us an estimate nearly half the size of our results found using binary CEP
eligibility. Looking to our results by school grade type, we find that CEP participation leads to
decreases in school-level average BMI for elementary, middle, and high schools, but the effect is
only statistically significant for middle schools and marginally so.
Taken together, the results of Tables 27 and 28 for our full sample of schools suggest that the
expected change in InHFZ% and average BMI following CEP participation are most likely driven
by overweight and obese children losing weight and falling into the healthy weight range. If it is
the case that changes in the percent of healthy weight students are driven by underweight students
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gaining weight and moving into the healthy weight range, then we would not expect to see nega-
tive effects of CEP participation on BMI. Alternatively, if the estimated decrease in average BMI
is driven by healthy weight or underweight children losing weight, it would not likely be accom-
panied by an increase in InHFZ%. While it is entirely possible that participating in the CEP also
leads to variation elsewhere in the distribution of child weight, we believe that weight loss among
overweight and obese children following adoption of the CEP is the most plausible explanation of
our findings.
In addition to potential heterogeneity in the effect of CEP participation on child weight by
school grade type, we also expect that CEP participation may have differential impacts among
schools in different location types. To test for this location specific heterogeneity, we estimate our
primary results separately for schools in urban areas, rural areas, and suburbs/towns. The primary
reasons why we would expect the relationship between school meals and child health to differ for
schools in different areas a priori relate to area specific trends in factors like food insecurity and
institutional beliefs and practices. For example, children attending a low-income urban school may
be more likely to live in a food desert, implying that the nutritional quality of meals may be the
most crucial component of school meals rather then their caloric content. Alternatively, families in
rural areas may be less likely to enroll their child in a nutrition assistance program due to stigma
or personal beliefs regarding government assistance programs.
Table 29 shows the results of our first stage estimates separated by school location type un-
der the binary CEP eligibility specification and the ISP interaction specification. Beginning with
Panel A of Table 29, we find that CEP eligibility leads to positive and statistically significant in-
creases in the probability of participation for schools in all location types. Urban schools see a
substantially larger effect at 73.1 percentage points compared to 48.5 percentage points and 37.8
percentage points for rural schools and schools in suburbs/towns, respectively. This difference is
likely the result of urban schools having higher average ISPs than rural schools or schools in sub-
urbs/towns, making them more likely to participate in the CEP. Less clear is why the estimated
change in the probability of CEP participation caused by CEP eligibility is 22% higher for rural
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schools relative to schools in suburbs/towns given that both sets of schools have roughly the same
average ISP among the set of eligible schools at 53.6% and 54.1%, respectively. Looking at Panel
B of Table 29, we find that rural schools are more reactive to changes in ISP relative to schools in
suburbs/towns with respect to CEP participation. This differential may explain why CEP eligible
rural schools are found more likely to participate in the provision under our binary CEP eligibility
specification relative to schools in suburbs/towns.
Table 30 shows our primary results under the binary CEP eligibility specification separated by
school location type. In Panel A of Table 30, we find that CEP participation leads to positive effects
on the percentage of healthy weight students attending urban schools, rural schools, and schools in
suburbs/towns. The effect is only found to be statistically significant at the 10% level for urban and
rural schools, but statistically insignificant for schools in suburbs/towns. We find the largest effect
among urban schools where CEP participation is estimated to increase the percentage of healthy
weight students attending a school by 2.54 percentage points relative to the 1.94 percentage point
increase for rural schools. Given the average number of students and InHFZ% of urban and rural
CEP eligible schools, CEP participation is expected to cause roughly 16 more children to fall into
the healthy weight range for urban schools and 13 students in rural schools. While statistically
insignificant, the effect for schools in suburbs/towns indicates that roughly 13 additional students
will fall into the healthy weight range following adoption of the CEP. While the implied number
of students is the same for rural schools and schools in suburbs/towns, the overall percent change
is smaller for suburbs/towns since they are larger on average relative to their rural counterparts.
Panel B of Table 30 shows the primary results for average BMI under the binary eligibility spec-
ification separated by school location type. We find that CEP participation leads to an expected
decrease in average BMI for schools in all location types. Surprisingly, the effect is statistically
insignificant for urban schools and only significant at the 10% level for rural schools, but statisti-
cally significant below the 1% level for schools in suburbs/towns. We also find that the effect for
schools in suburbs/towns is significantly larger in magnitude compared to our estimates for urban
and rural schools.
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Table 31 shows our primary results for InHFZ% under the ISP interaction specification sepa-
rated by school location type. Beginning with Panel A of Table 31, we again find that the CEP
participation leads to increases in the expected percentage of healthy weight students attending a
school for schools in all location types. We find the effect of CEP participation on InHFZ% to be
statistically significant below the 1% and 5% levels for urban and rural schools, respectively, and
statistically insignificant for schools in suburbs/towns. Compared to our results using the binary
CEP eligibility specification, we see a substantial increase in the statistical significance of our es-
timates under the ISP interaction specification for urban and rural schools. Furthermore, we find
a meaningful increase in the effect’s magnitude for urban schools and a decrease in the effect size
for rural schools. While we expect urban schools to see roughly 16 more healthy weight students
following adoption of the CEP under our binary eligibility specification, we estimate that an addi-
tional 23 students will be within the healthy weight range using our ISP interaction specification.
Alternatively, the same increase for rural schools goes from 13 additional students under the binary
specification to 10 using our ISP interactions as instruments for CEP participation.
Finally, Panel B of Table 31 shows the results of our model for average BMI under the ISP
interaction specification separated by school location type. While the effect of CEP participation
on average BMI is negative for schools in all location types, the effects are statistically insignifi-
cant. These results stand in contrast to those of our binary eligibility specification in Panel B of
Table 30. Compared to our ISP interaction specification estimates, we find larger effects of CEP
participation on BMI for rural schools and schools in suburbs/towns. While we find no statistically
significant effect using our ISP interaction instruments, we find the effect of CEP participation on
average BMI to be statistically significant for rural schools and schools in suburbs/towns using our
binary specification at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively.
2.5 Sensitivity Analysis
We now test the validity of our estimation strategy and the sensitivity of our results presented in
Section 2.4. First, we perform a placebo test using data from the pre-CEP period. In placebo test-
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ing, the primary analysis is replicated using a pseudo outcome that is expected not to be affected
by the treatment (Athey and Imbens, 2017). In other words, the true value of the point estimate
for the pseudo outcome should be zero. Rejecting the null hypothesis in this case would bring the
credibility of our original analysis into question. While various pseudo outcomes can be tested, we
use variables related to future CEP eligibility and participation as independent variables of interest
in models of pre-CEP period outcomes.
Our falsification test involves designating the group of schools that were eligible to participate
in the CEP at some point during the 2014-2016 period and indicating the 2012-2013 school year
as a false post-treatment period. We then perform the placebo test with a difference-in-differences
(DID) model of our aggregate weight outcomes using data from the 2011-2012 and 2012-2013
school years. Our approach can be likened to comparing the pre-CEP period trends of InHFZ%
and mean BMI for the groups of ever and never CEP eligible schools. Finding an effect from fu-
ture CEP eligibility during the pre-CEP period would suggest that trends in the aggregate weight
outcomes of interest differed by CEP eligibility prior to the provision’s introduction, implying that
our estimates may not represent valid treatment effects.11
Table 32 shows the results of our placebo test for the full sample of schools and by school grade
type using future CEP eligibility status as a false treatment indicator during the pre-CEP period.
We find no statistically significant effect from future CEP eligibility on either InHFZ% or average
BMI during the pre-CEP period. The results of our placebo test suggest that, conditional on our
model’s other covariates, the trends in our aggregate weight outcomes were not statistically dif-
ferent between the set of CEP eligible and ineligible schools prior to the provision’s introduction.
This supports our approach using plausibly exogenous timing in CEP eligibility as an instrument
for CEP participation. Furthermore, since the estimated effect of future CEP eligibility on In-
HFZ% is negative during the pre-CEP period, the positive effect of CEP participation we find in
our primary results are likely conservative. We similarly find positive coefficients on future CEP
11While this approach compares trends in our outcomes of interest between the CEP eligible and non-eligible
groups, it is limited by the fact that we only have two pre-CEP school years. More pre-CEP period data would be
preferred, but unfortunately data only go back to the 2011-2012 school year.
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eligibility in our placebo test of BMI for elementary, middle, and high schools, implying that the
negative effects of CEP participation on average BMI we observe in our primary results are likely
to be conservative as well.
Moving now to the sensitivity of our results to alternative specifications, one potential concern
with our study is that the average treatment effects we estimate may largely be driven by the set of
schools with the highest ISPs. We test the sensitivity of our results to the exclusion of these high
ISP outliers by omitting 195 schools with ISPs above the ISP 90th percentile of 66%. For both
our binary CEP eligibility and ISP interaction specifications, we find that excluding these high ISP
schools has no notable impact on our first stage results for the full sample of schools, our results
by school grade type, or our results by school location type.
With regards to the effect of CEP participation on InHFZ% after excluding the set of high ISP
schools, the only noteworthy changes we find are the change from 1.27 percentage points to 1.36
percentage points for the full sample of schools and a slight change in our estimate magnitudes
for suburbs/towns. Our results for average school-level BMI also remain largely unchanged af-
ter omitting schools with the highest ISPs. We find no significant change in our BMI estimates
under the binary eligibility specification. The estimates for our ISP interaction specification also
remain robust for the entire sample after omitting the subset of high ISP schools. The most notable
change in our results by school grade type is in the effect for middle schools which changes from
marginally significant to statistically insignificant when we exclude high ISP schools, but the effect
magnitudes are nearly identical to one another.
We omit the 2013-2014 school year from our primary analyses since we are unable to identify
which schools were eligible and/or participating in the CEP during Georgia’s year as a pilot state.
Alternatively, we can make the assumption that schools have the same ISP, CEP eligibility, and
CEP participation status in 2013-2014 that we observe in 2014-2015. While this assumption af-
fords us an additional year of data and likely holds true in many cases, imputing our CEP variables
and including data from 2013-2014 introduces additional noise into our estimations.
To see how including the 2013-2014 school year changes our results, Tables 33 and 34 show
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our first stage results with the set of imputed 2012-2014 CEP variables by school grade and loca-
tion type, respectively. As the table’s show, our results remain generally robust to the inclusion of
the 2013-2014 school year under both the binary CEP eligibility and ISP interaction specifications.
We find slightly smaller effects of CEP eligibility on CEP participation on average after including
2013-2014, a change we would expect to see if CEP eligible schools were generally less likely to
participate in the program during the provision’s pilot year.
Tables 35, 36, 37, and 38 show the results of our model’s second stage under the same spec-
ifications used to create our primary results after including the 2013-2014 school year. The most
common changes in our estimates with 2013-2014 are decreases in effect magnitudes and levels
of statistical significance. Given that the CEP was piloted in Georgia during the 2013-2014 school
year, we expect that many schools were considerably less likely to participate in the CEP during
their pilot year relative to later years.12 The likely reason for this is uncertainty in the program’s
effects, likelihood of lasting longer than the pilot period, and costs. Assuming that true partici-
pation rates are lower during the pilot period, we would expect to see smaller effects from CEP
participation on student weight outcomes relative to our primary results because many schools will
be misclassified as having participated in 2013-2014 when they did not truly adopt the CEP until
2014-2015. Regardless, we find that including 2013-2014 in our analysis does not quantitatively
change our results or their implications.
2.6 Conclusion
In this study, we estimate the Community Eligibility Provision’s (CEP’s) effect on school-level
measures of child weight for the population of public K-12 schools in the state of Georgia. We
use two specifications of CEP eligibility and Identified Student Percentage (ISP) as instruments
for CEP participation in regressions separated by school grade type and school location type in
addition to regressions using the full sample of schools. Our primary outcomes of interest are the
percentage of students attending a school who are in the healthy weight range and average school-
12Lower CEP participation rates during the CEP pilot period are shown in studies using data from CEP pilot states
like Ruffini (2018) and Gordon and Ruffini (2018).
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level Body Mass Index (BMI) score.
Our results suggest that CEP participation simultaneously increases the percentage of healthy
weight students attending a school and decreases school-level average BMI. Our estimates are
largely consistent across specifications and we find no statistically significant evidence to support
a detrimental effect from CEP participation on school-level child weight. We find that CEP par-
ticipation produces the largest increases in healthy weight percentage for middle schools, urban
schools, and rural schools. We also find that elementary and middle schools see the most signifi-
cant decreases in average BMI following CEP adoption.
Our results stand in contrast to seminal studies looking at the effect of school lunch on child
weight. While Schanzenbach (2009) and Millimet et al. (2010) find that school lunch participa-
tion increases child weight, we do not find evidence to support the assumption that universal free
school meals worsen child health. One possible cause of this discrepancy is that the CEP makes
both lunch and breakfast free to all students. Given that some existing studies have found partic-
ipation in school lunch, rather than breakfast, leads to worsened health outcomes (Millimet et al.
2010), it may be the case that the beneficial effects of CEP participation are driven by breakfast
rather than lunch. Alternatively, Schwartz and Rothbart (2017) find some evidence of a positive
effect from providing universal free school lunch on child weight among non-poor eighth graders
in New York City even though universal free breakfast had been in place for years prior.
The effects of CEP participation we observe may also differ from the results of previous stud-
ies on school meal participation due to changes in meal quality during the pre-CEP period. In
addition to creating the CEP, 2010’s Healthy Hunger Free Kids Act(HHFKA) changed the nation’s
minimum nutrition standards for school meals. Prior to the HHFKA’s revised minimum nutrition
standards, meals served in school may have been more likely to be lower quality relative to meals
brought from home, implying that we would expect to see fewer students with improved weight
outcomes following the switch to school meals. If so, increased meal participation could lead to the
detrimental health effects observed by early studies. In light of these nutrition standard changes, it
is especially important that we revisit the relationship between school meals and child health.
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Finally, the variations in free school meal enrollment following participation in the CEP also
occurs at different margins than changes to factors like family income eligibility or categorical
eligibility laws. Most notably, the CEP affects children who were already eligible for free meals
but were not participating and children living in families with incomes above the existing free
or reduced-price eligibility range. CEP participation removes child-level self-selection into free
school meal programs entirely, implying that the negative health effects found in previous studies
may be due to adverse selection into school meals under the traditional system; a theory supported
by Millimet et al. (2010). Furthermore, it is possible that the beneficial effects we observe are
driven by mechanisms other than changes to meal consumption. For example, it may be the case
that removing the stigma surrounding free lunch participation in CEP schools produces weight
improvements among students who were already eating school meal in the pre-CEP period. Un-
fortunately, we are not able to evaluate this possibility more thoroughly using our current data.
In addition to the difference between our results and those of previous school meal participa-
tion studies, our findings also differ from those presented in Chapter 1. In Chapter 1, I find that
attending a CEP school leads to an expected decrease in the probability of healthy weight and an
expected increase in BMI percentile. The reason for this discrepancy may be driven by a number
of different factors. First, both studies utilize samples taken from different populations and at dif-
ferent levels of aggregation. In Chapter 1, data come from a nationally representative child-level
longitudinal survey of elementary school aged students. We use school-level data in this chapter
from the population of K-12 schools in the state of Georgia. Differences in how the CEP affects
students of different ages and students in different areas of the country may account in the oppo-
site relationship between the CEP and child weight found in both studies. Additionally, the use of
school-level data may also be the reason. For example, the school-level outcomes for elementary
schools used in this chapter do not allow us to isolate the effects for students in late elementary
school who are the subjects of interest in Chapter 1.
Unlike Chapter 1, my results do agree with the findings of other studies measuring the effects of
the CEP on child weight like Rothbart, Schwartz, and Gutierrez (2020) and Schwartz and Rothbart
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(2017). Like the results found in this chapter, however, both Rothbart, Schwartz, and Gutierrez
(2020) and Schwartz and Rothbart (2017) use data from a single state and single city, respectively.
Furthermore, both studies only use data for students in a narrow age range, further limiting the
external validity of their results. Looking to the current literature concerning the CEP’s effect on
child weight, there are two obvious questions which are still outstanding. First, which areas of the
country/types of students see beneficial effects from CEP participation and which do not? Second,
why? As it stands, additional studies covering more places and types of students are needed to find
definitive answers.
Moving past the results found in other studies, given that our results suggest participation in the
CEP leads to improved school-level child weight outcomes, an important question becomes - what
factors determine a school’s participation choice in Georgia? While not explicitly presented here,
results from a simple model of CEP participation gives some insight into possible decision factors.
First, schools with more students enrolled in free or reduced-price lunch during the pre-CEP period
are less likely to sign up for the provision. The cause of this relationship may be that schools with
the majority of their students already receiving free or reduced-price meals deciding that the small
increase in uptake caused by the CEP is not worth the effort. This possibility stands in contrast
to the assumption that schools with high numbers of students enrolled in free and reduced-price
meals are still adequately incentivized to participate in the CEP due to the reduction in administra-
tive costs caused by removing meal applications.
We also find CEP eligible schools with identified student percentages below 62.5% are less
likely to participate since CEP schools with ISPs between 40% and 62.5% only have a portion of
their meals reimbursed at the free rate by the USDA. This further supports the idea that program
costs play a role in each school’s likelihood of participation discussed in Chapter 1. Furthermore,
we find that schools within the 40% to 62.5% range are more likely to participate as their ISPs
increase. If barely eligible schools are dissuaded from participating in the CEP because of re-
imbursement rates, our results suggest that the USDA may be able to significantly improve child
weight by changing the CEP’s current reimbursement scheme to raise the CEP enrollment rate
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among schools right above the eligibility threshold.
County-level poverty also seems to play a complex role in the CEP participation decision. For
example, we find that the overall percentage of a school’s county living in poverty is negatively
correlated with CEP participation, indicating that schools in counties that are poorer overall are
less likely to adopt the provision. While this relationship may again be due to differences in pre-
CEP free and reduced/price meal enrollment rates, we find that the poorest counties in Georgia do
not have more children enrolled in free school meals on average. Alternatively, schools in counties
with higher levels of child poverty are more likely to adopt the CEP, implying that the distribution
of poverty by age group within a county affects the participation decision.
Finally, we find that eligible schools in urban areas are more likely to participate in the program
than schools in suburbs/towns while rural schools are not. Rural schools in Georgia have the low-
est number of students enrolled in free and reduced/price meals during the pre-CEP period even
though they serve children in the state’s poorest counties. Therefore, the low uptake rate among
rural schools diverges from the CEP’s primary goal of providing free school meals to children who
were not adequately reached by the traditional system. If disadvantaged schools in different areas
continue to participate at different rates, the CEP may unintendedly perpetuate location specific
disparities in child health.
While the results of our study provide important evidence regarding the CEP’s effect on school-
level measures of child health, future research is needed to understand the effects of universal free
school meals at the child-level. As spoken to throughout our study, school-level measures of health
identify specific moments of an underlying child-level distribution, making it impossible to deter-
mine where changes stem from. The results of Chapter 1 work towards filling this gap in the
research, but those still deal with a reasonably small age range of students. Furthermore, our study
ignores other mechanisms through which free school meal provisions could either improve or harm
the lives of children and their families. Other studies like Schwartz and Rothbart (2017), Ruffini
(2018), Gordon and Ruffini (2018), Rothbart, Schwartz, and Gutierrez (2020), and Gordanier et al.
(2019) examine some of these additional outcomes, but more work is still needed to fully under-
59
stand the CEP’s effects on individuals at all levels.
Unlike Chapter 1, we are also limited by the use of data from schools in only one state. While
this provides us with some advantage in that all schools share the same state-level environment,
we are unable to examine the effects of CEP participation on school-level weight in other states.
This limitation is especially important given the degree of variation in pre- and post-CEP school
environments and CEP participation rates across state lines. For example, while 92.2% of CEP
eligible schools chose to participate in Ohio during the 2016-2017 school year, only 15.1% of el-
igible California schools participated in the CEP during the same year. It is most likely the case
that differences across states affect the school meal environment of low-income schools as well as
how the provision of universal free meals impacts child health.
Finally, additional work is needed to better understand the possible interactions, decisions, and
outcomes schools face when choosing whether or not to participate in the CEP. Aside from the
observable determinants of participation, one possible factor which we have not seen considered
in the literature is school-level stigma. If schools choose not to adopt the CEP because they feel
that it will negatively effect their public perception, our results indicate that the choice of non-
participation may come at the expense of forgone improvements to the health of their students.
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Chapter 3
A FLEXIBLE MODEL OF FOOD SECURITY: ESTIMATION AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR PREDICTION
Note: This chapter represents coauthored work with Rusty Tchernis and Christian Gregory. Fund-
ing for this project comes from a cooperative agreement with the United States Department of
Agriculture’s Economic Research Service.
3.1 Introduction
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) defines food insecurity as “. . . a household-
level economic and social condition of limited or uncertain access to adequate food” (Coleman-
Jensen et al., 2016). Naturally, this definition is broad as the intersectional interpretation of food
insecurity varies across sociodemographic and community-level contexts. For example, while not
having a reliable source of fresh fruits and vegetables may be the primary cause of food insecurity
for an inner-city household living in a food desert, not having the income needed to purchase foods
that are readily available may lead to food insecurity among rural households. Given the issue’s
complexity, measures of food security and insecurity must incorporate information spanning mul-
tiple dimensions of economic and social determinates in order to properly evaluate the conditions
of households facing different issues.
The most common measure of domestic household food security utilizes questions from the
core Food Security Module (FSM) which was initially piloted in the 1995 Current Population Sur-
vey (CPS). The FSM uses a 10-item questionnaire for all households, and an additional 8 questions
regarding child food security for households with children. The questionnaire covers a broad range
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of conditions and behaviors that are more and less severe such as “We worried whether our food
would run out before we got money to buy more” and “We couldn’t afford to eat balanced meals.”1
With a household’s total number of affirmative responses to the FSM questions, researchers
commonly use an accompanying food security scale to assign households one of three food se-
curity statuses and one of three child food security statuses if the household has children.2 The
initial construction of this food security scale was partially data-driven in that final question se-
lection and determination of each question’s relative contribution to a household’s food security
level was determined using three years of nationally representative pilot data and techniques from
Item Response Theory (IRT), more specifically a 1-parameter Rasch (1PR) model.3 This approach
stands in contrast to many indices which rely entirely on expert opinion regarding the assumed
contribution of each observed variable to assign weights deterministically.
In general, there are two main benefits to measuring food security using the standard FSM
scale. First, since the FSM only includes at most 18 items, the questionnaire can be incorpo-
rated into new or existing surveys without placing considerable burden on survey participants and
interviewers. Since its initial introduction, many large U.S. surveys have incorporated the FSM
including the CPS, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the Survey of Income and Pro-
gram Participation (SIPP), and the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES).
Second, categorical measures of food security are easy to interpret, and assigning a status to each
household in a data set can be done quickly. This ease of use makes the complex concept of food
security convenient and approachable for researchers, policy makers, and other interested parties.
While the FSM scale and other similar methods may be simple and convenient, researchers
have consistently voiced the need for better measures (Barrett, 2010, Headey and Ecker, 2013,
Ruel, 2003, Maxwell et al., 1999). Overall, concerns regarding the FSM scale seem to be more
common than issues with the questions themselves. The first issue is that using discrete categories
to measure food security necessarily suppresses information about a continuous latent outcome
1For a full list of questions, see Coleman-Jensen et al. (2016).
2In this context, an affirmative response is one which indicates an undesirable outcome with regards to food secu-
rity.
3For more information regarding the measure’s construction, see Ohls, Radbill, and Schirm (2001).
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of interest. In the case of the FSM scale, the cutoffs for each food security level were chosen
by expert opinion (Ohls, Radbill, and Schirm, 2001). The use of deterministic cutoffs partially
defeats the purpose of using a data-driven model like the 1PR to measure food security. While
data inform each question’s weight in the measurement model, opinion determines the ultimate
scale used by practitioners. Furthermore, the placement of households into a small number of cat-
egories abstracts away from any within-category variation in food security. For example, Gregory
and Coleman-Jensen (2017) find differences in the health of adults living in marginally food secure
and fully food secure households even though the traditional FSM scale does not delineate between
the two groups.
The second issue concerns the scale’s suppression of information at the question-level. The
1PR measurement model can only be used with binary “affirmative/negative” type observed vari-
ables. While some FSM questions like “In the last 12 months, did you ever cut the size of any of
the children’s meals because there wasn’t enough money for food?” are answered as either yes or
no, many of the FSM’s questions have more than two potential responses. Specifically, 6 ques-
tions can be answered as “often, sometimes, or never”, and 3 have potential responses of “almost
every month, some months but not every month, in only 1 or 2 months, or never.” Converting each
question into a binary indicator ignores potentially valuable information regarding the underlying
severity of each household’s latent food security level. This restriction implies that for two house-
holds, one answering “sometimes” for all appropriate questions and the other with “often” will be
effectively indistinguishable from one another. Naturally, one would assume a priori that “often”
indicates a more severe condition than “sometimes.”
The third issue is that there is no way to incorporate additional information into the existing
food security scale. While the FSM covers a range of topics, it does not include potentially impor-
tant information like having the transportation required to get food, the number of individuals in
the household, participation in nutrition assistance programs, etc. Since the scale was created using
only the 18 FSM variables, the contribution of each variable would be invalidated after adding ad-
ditional variables. There is no intuitive way to incorporate additional information into an existing
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scale without re-estimating the underlying measurement model, and since many of these potential
observed variables would also be non-binary, they cannot be used in a 1PR model without alter-
ation.
The fourth issue is that the existing measure does not account for the inherent uncertainty in
measuring a latent variable. While the scale was created using a probabilistic measurement model,
it does not incorporate any measure of uncertainty directly. Having no measure of uncertainty is
especially important when comparing the food security levels of different households or groups of
households. While the scale assigns each household with a single value, it is possible that certain
households could fall into more than one category if their statistically plausible range of latent food
security falls across one or more category thresholds.
Finally, in addition to the FSM scale’s technical limitations, the existing scale was designed
using estimates from data that are more than two decades old at the time of this writing. While
the scale’s creators showed that the 1995 estimates were stable across time using data from 1996
and 1997, the underlying food security environment of households in the U.S. has almost certainly
changed during the years since. To this point, the scale’s designers state “. . . we recommend con-
tinuing to estimate the IRT model item parameters each year, as data become available.”4 If the
model’s parameters are re-estimated each year, the benefit of estimating the measurement model
once and then using a more convenient scale in future research is diminished. Furthermore, even
if the 1PR model is stable across time using data from the same survey, it may be the case that
estimates are unstable when using data from other sources even though the same set of questions
are used.
To address these limitations, we propose an alternative measure to the standard 1PR derived
FSM food security scale. Specifically, we estimate household-level food security using a Bayesian
Graded Response Model (BGRM). The BGRM has several attractive features which correct for
each of the issues discussed above regarding the FSM scale and measurement model. First, the
BGRM estimates latent food security as a continuous variable, removing the need for discreet cat-
4For a detailed discussion of the 1PR measurement model’s stability across time, see Ohls, Radbill, and Schirm,
2001.
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egories of food security based on deterministic cutoffs. Second, the BGRM allows us to estimate
food security using both binary and ordinal variables. This feature allows us to incorporate any
information about response severity at the intensive margin provided by the FSM’s non-binary
questions. Third, the BGRM is flexible enough to include different sets of observed variables.
Examples of these could include new questions related to the distinct domains of food security
like “When we did not have enough food to eat, we received food from a food bank, church, etc.”
which would capture the role of community aid in determining food security. By adding or remov-
ing variables, researchers can evaluate different dimensions of food security which are not captured
by the FSM. Finally, as a Bayesian model, the BGRM estimates draws from a posterior distribution
of food security for each household. Using approximated moments of these distributions, we can
provide measures of uncertainty along with point estimates.
In addition to addressing concerns with the FSM scale and 1PR measurement model, our
methodology has two primary strengths. The first is that only questions for which a household
provides valid responses are used when estimating their food security level. This feature allows us
to estimate food security for households who only have valid data for a subset of questions in addi-
tion to households with complete responses. Finally, similar to the logic behind using the original
1PR measurement model, the relative contributions of each manifest variable to latent food security
is informed by the data. Unlike the traditional method, however, the purpose of our model is not
to ultimately create a food security scale, but rather to estimate latent food security separately in
each application. Our model can therefore capture potential changes in the underlying relationship
between observable variables and latent food security across time, groups, and data sets while the
standard scale cannot.
In the remainder of this study we present the BGRM framework, derive the model, present
the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm used to estimate the model’s parameters, and
discuss estimation results from a simulated data exercise.
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3.2 The Bayesian Graded Response Model of Food Security
Our model of food security uses the following parameters and variables:
1. yij denotes the response of household i = 1, ..., I , to FSM question j = 1, ..., J . Each ques-
tion j has a set of potential responses ranging from 1 to Cj , implying that yij ∈ {1, ..., Cj}.
2. The variable δi represents the latent food security level of household i which is invariant
across the set of FSM responses provided by the household.5
3. The set of question specific intercept parameters µ = µ1, ..., µJ .
4. Response thresholds for each question j denoted by γj = γj0, γ
j
1, ..., γ
j
Cj
, such that γjk−1 ≤
γjk for all k = 1, ..., Cj .
5. Random variation in the elicited food security level of household iwith respect to question j,
eij , which captures the fact that a question’s ability to measure latent food security is subject
to error.
With these variables, the model of household responses is defined as follows. Household i
answers question j with response yij = k if and only if:
γjk−1 < µj + δi + eij ≤ γ
j
k (3.1)
Assume that the distribution of each eij is Normal with mean 0 and question specific variance σ2j .
Furthermore, we set the first and last response threshold of each question j such that γj0 = −∞
and γjCj =∞.
The model of FSM responses given by (3.1) implies that the probability household i provides
5Throughout this paper, we refer to δ as latent food security, but in the case of the FSM all questions are thought to
be negatively related to food insecurity. This difference is an issue of interpretation and is not fundamentally important
to our method.
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response k to question j is equal to:
P (yij = k) = Φ
(
γjk − (µj + δi)
σj
)
− Φ
(
γjk−1 − (µj + δi)
σj
)
(3.2)
where Φ() is the CDF of the standard Normal distribution.
The response probabilities given by (3.2) describe the likelihood of a graded response model
with a probit link, given formally by:
L(µ, δ, γ, σ2) =
∏
i
∏
j∈Ci
[
Φ
(
γjyij − (µj + δi)
σj
)
− Φ
(
γjyij−1 − (µj + δi)
σj
)]
(3.3)
The outer product of (3.3) extends over all households in the set of observed data, and the inner
product extends over the set of questions j answered by household i, denoted by Ci.
Looking at the model’s likelihood in equation (3.3), we see that not all of the model’s parame-
ters can be identified. As is the case with many ordinal response models, the value of the likelihood
does not change with affine transformations of each question’s response thresholds, intercepts, er-
ror variances, or latent food security levels. To address this, we restrict γj1 = 0 and make the
normalizing assumption that δi ∼ N(0, 1).
3.3 Parameter Prior Distributions
The prior distributions used in our model for structural parameters µ, σ2, and γ are given as:
µj ∼ N(µ̄, σ2µ), ∀j = 1, ..., J
σ2j ∼ IG(α, β), ∀j = 1, ..., J
γjk ∼ U(a, b)1(γ
j
k−1 < γ
j
k ≤ γ
j
k+1), ∀k = 1, ..., Cj − 1
where IG() denotes the inverse gamma distribution and U() denotes the uniform distribution.
In addition to the set of parameter prior distributions, we also define a latent variable, y∗ij , such
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that:
y∗ij = µj + δi + eij (3.4)
which gives the following augmented likelihood function over our model parameters and aug-
mented data:
L(µ, δ, γ, σ2, y∗) =
∏
i
∏
j∈Ci
φ
(
y∗ij − (µj + δi)
σj
)
1(γjyij−1 < y
∗
ij ≤ γjyij) (3.5)
Estimation of the model’s structural parameters, latent food security variables, and augmented data
values is performed using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm outlined in the fol-
lowing section.
3.4 Estimation Algorithm
Drawing from the posterior distributions of the model’s parameters and latent variables is done
using the following Gibbs Sampler algorithm.
Step 1. Sample δ.
For δ = [δ1, ..., δI ]′, let the estimation equation be given as:
y∗ − µ⊗ 1I = Λδ + e
where y∗ = [y∗1, ..., y
∗
J ]
′ is a stacked vector of y∗’s, 1I is a I × 1 vector of 1’s, Λ = II ⊗ 1J , II is
an I × I identity matrix, 1J is a J × 1 vector of 1’s, e = [e1, ..., eJ ]′, and ⊗ denotes the Kronecker
product.
All elements of δ are drawn simultaneously from the following full conditional posterior dis-
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tribution:
δ|µ, σ2, y∗, Y ∼ N(d,D) (3.6)
where D = [II + Λ′Σ−1Λ]
−1, d = D [Λ′Σ−1(y∗ − µ⊗ 1I)], and Σ is a J × J variance-covariance
matrix with diagonal elements (σ21, ..., σ
2
J) and zeros for the off diagonal elements.
Step 2. Sample elements of µ.
For each element of µ = [µ1, ..., µJ ]′, the estimation equation is given as:
y∗j − δ = 1Iµj + ej
Each µj is then drawn from the following full conditional posterior distribution:
µj|δ, σ2, y∗, Y ∼ N(v, V ) (3.7)
where V =
(
1
σ2µ
+
1′I1I
σ2j
)−1
and v = V
[
µ̄
σ2µ
+
1′I(y
∗
j−δ)
σ2j
]
.
Step 3. Sample elements of γ.
Samples for each element γjk of γ
j = [γj0, γ
j
1, ..., γ
j
Cj
], such that k = 2, ..., Cj − 1, are drawn from
the following full conditional posterior distribution:
γjk|γ
j
−k, y
∗, Y ∼ U(L,R) (3.8)
where L = max[max(y∗j |yij = k − 1), γ
j
k−1], and R = min[min(y
∗
j |yij = k + 1), γ
j
k+1].
Step 4. Sample elements of y∗.
Samples for each element y∗ij of y
∗ = [y∗1, ..., y
∗
J ]
′ are drawn from the following full conditional
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posterior distribution:
y∗ij|µ, δ, σ2, γ, Y ∼ N
(
µj + δi, σ
2
j
)
(3.9)
truncated to the interval (γjyij−1, γ
j
yij
).
Step 5. Sample elements of σ2.
For each element of σ2 = [σ21, ..., σ
2
J ]
′, the estimation equation is given as:
y∗j = 1Iµj + δ + ej
Each σ2j is then drawn from the following full conditional posterior distribution:
σ2j |µ, δ, γ, Y ∼ IG(a, b) (3.10)
where a = α + I
2
, and b =
[
1
β
+
(y∗j−1Iµj−δ)′(y∗j−1Iµj−δ)
2
]−1
.
3.5 Simulated Data Exercise
To test the predictive capabilities of the BGRM, data are simulated for a set of I = 10, 000 house-
holds answering a set of J = 10 questions. The potential responses of each question is set to
mimic those of the adult food security component of the FSM, implying that C = [C1, C2, ..., C10]
is defined as C = [3, 3, 3, 2, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3]. This mix of binary and polytomous response data is
something that strictly dichotomous or strictly polytomous IRT models can not estimate, but our
BGRM is well suited for such cases.
The set of data generating structural parameters is given in Table 39 below. The food security
level of each household i is constructed such that δi ∼ N(0, 1). The error term for each household
i’s response to question j is constructed such that eij ∼ N(0, σ2j ), and each y∗ij and yij are con-
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structed using (3.4) and (3.1), respectively. The Gibbs Sampler algorithm outlined in Section 3.4
was run for 20,000 iterations with the first 10,000 draws removed for burn-in.
Beginning with visual inspection of the estimation process, Figures 10 through 13 show the
draws of our model’s structural parameters and mean latent factor draws over all iterations. Start-
ing with Figure 10, we see that samples from the posterior distributions of each µ are reasonably
stable around the true value of 1 from the first few hundred iterations onward. None of the µ’s see
a structural deviation in their draw chain from the true data generating value. Like the behavior
shown in Figure 10, Figure 11 shows that draws of σ2 are similarly stable across the full set of
iterations and centered around their true values. Likewise, we see that the history of draws of the
posterior mean of δ is reasonably stable during the full sampling period and centered around the
true value of δ’s mean, 0.
Examining the samples of γ2 for questions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 10 in Figure 13, we see that the
sampling history of our threshold parameters is less well behaved. While three of the threshold pa-
rameters converge to the neighborhood around the data generating values, the threshold parameters
of the other two questions do not. The figure shows a notable decrease in the sampling variance
of our γ2’s around the 10,000 iteration mark, but they do not seem to fully converge across the
entire sampling period. One potential reason for the sizable variance in our samples of γ2 is that
the sampler simply did not run for long enough to converge. The slow convergence of parameters
in Bayesian polytomous data models is a well documented problem even in the earliest literature
(Albert and Chib, 1993, Cowles, 1996, Nandram and Chen, 1996). Alternatively, it may be the case
that traditional convergence of our γ2’s to a tight bandwidth around their true value is not feasible
given how little information is given by the observed response data. Estimation of the model using
the true data generating values of y∗ leads to substantially faster and tighter convergence of γ, im-
plying that the additional information provided by the continuous y∗ leads to the improvement in
parameter retrieval accuracy we would expect a priori.
Moving on from our graphical analysis, Table 40 compares the data generating values of our
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parameters to their estimated posterior mean and 95% credible intervals.6 Beginning with our esti-
mates of µ, we see that the posterior mean value is qualitatively close to the data generating value
in all cases. Furthermore, the true data generating value of each µj falls within the posterior 95%
credible interval in all cases. Looking to our estimates of σ2, we again see that the posterior mean
and data generating values are reasonably close to one another. Alternatively, the 95% credible
interval of σ2 does not cover the true value in the single case of question 5. Finally, moving to the
estimates of γ2 shown in Table 40, we find that while seemingly similar to their data generating
values, the 95% credible intervals of γ only cover the true parameter value in three out of the five
total cases. This again may be due to not having enough iterations to achieve convergence, but it
may also be the result of utilizing limited response data.
As an alternative to checking whether the true value falls within the estimated 95% credible
interval of each parameter, similar studies often rely on various forms of the Root Mean Squared
Error (RMSE) calculated using the data generating and estimated parameter values (Zhu and Stone,
2011, Kieftenbeld and Natesan, 2012, Broomell and Bhatia, 2014). Taking this approach, we cal-
culate the RMSE of our estimates for each parameter using the full set of post-burn-in draws from
the posterior distribution. The RMSE of each parameter type is then averaged, giving us the aver-
age RMSE of µ, σ2, and γ2. We find that the average RMSE of µ, σ2, and γ2 are 0.029, 0.0431,
and 0.0367, respectively. In line with other common statistical problems, there is no single RMSE
value that signifies adequate parameter retrieval. However, we do find that our RMSE’s fall well
below the thresholds used in similar studies (Zhu and Stone, 2011, Kieftenbeld and Natesan, 2012).
We now discuss our model’s ability to accurately predict each household’s latent food security
variable. Figure 14 shows the posterior mean value of δ for each household along the x-axis and
true data generating values of δ on the y-axis, along with a 45 degree line. Looking at the figure
suggests two obvious traits. First, our estimated values of δ correspond well with their true values.
6The values in parentheses in Table 40 show 95% credible intervals given by the post-burn-in posterior draw of
each parameter corresponding to the specified percentile value. In this specific case, the 10,000 post-burn-in iterations
are first ordered from smallest to largest. The left credible interval value is then given by the 250th draw and the
right interval as the 9750th draw. The “NE” designation implies that the specified parameter is fixed and therefore not
estimated by the model.
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Households with higher posterior mean values of δ are associated with higher data generating food
security levels. Second, Figure 14 shows a substantial amount of binning in our estimates of δ.
Specifically, the posterior mean values of δ fall into easily identifiable groups with discreet jumps
across most groups. This binning is a byproduct of relying on ordinal polytomous data. For a given
set of households with identical responses in the observed data, the model can only partially dis-
tinguish between the relative food security level of households within the set. This limitation leads
to households with the same responses having similar posterior mean values of δ, forming bins.
Furthermore, in this specific exercise, values of µ, σ2, and γ are constructed so that they are the
same across all questions. With equal parameter values across questions, questions are also treated
as equal in so far as how they affect δ. For example, an individual who answers 3 to question 1 and
1 to all other questions will be placed into the same bin of posterior mean δ as another individual
who answers 3 to question 2 and 1 to all others. Alternatively, variation in parameter values across
questions increases both the predictive power of δ posterior mean the number of final bins since
questions are now distinct from one another in how they relate to δ. Given that assigning identical
parameters across questions can therefore be seen as a less than optimal scenario, we still find that
our model produces estimates that generally correspond to their true value.
Finally, we compare the relative abilities of both the BGRM and FSM scale to accurately pre-
dict household food security status. First, we designate the 20th percentile of our data generating
δ’s as the cutoff between food security and food insecurity, implying that households with values
of δ below the 20th percentile are categorized as “food insecure” while households with δ’s above
the 20th percentile are “food secure”. Next we categorize households as either food secure or food
insecure using the posterior mean estimates of δ from our BGRM. To then categorize households
using the FSM scale, we use the standard approach where households are considered food inse-
cure if they have 3 or more responses indicative of food insecurity.7 Finally, we redefine the food
insecurity cutoff point to the 50th and 5th percentiles to evaluate the sensitivity of both measures
to changes in underlying food insecurity rates. This involves changing the percentile used for both
7Since responses to each of the 10 questions are positively related to food security, responses indicative of food
insecurity include a response of 1 or 2 to questions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 10, and a response of 1 to questions 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9.
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the data generating δ’s and posterior mean δ’s while keeping the FSM scale the same.
We measure classification accuracy using the proper match rate and the mismatch rate. To de-
fine these, note that each household i has a true food security status Fi such that Fi is equal to 1
if the household is food secure and 0 otherwise. Given each household’s estimated food security
status F̂i from either the BGRM or FSM scale, we then define a proper match Pi = 1 as the case
where Fi = F̂i and a mismatch Pi = 0 as the case where Fi 6= F̂i. The proper match rate is then
calculated as (
∑I
i=1 Pi)/I and the mismatch rate is given by 1 minus the proper match rate. Table 41
shows the proper match rates and mismatch rates for both the BGRM and FSM scale under our
three percentile thresholds of food security. Beginning with the 20th percentile definition in Panel
A of Table 41, we see that the proper match rate for the BGRM and FSM scale are 0.94 and 0.52,
respectively. This implies that while food security categories estimated using the BGRM were
correct 94% of the time, categorizations from the FSM scale were only correct for roughly 52% of
households. We find that the BGRM similarly outperforms the FSM scale when the food security
cutoff is set to the 50th and 5th percentile in Panel B and Panel C, respectively.
While we find that the BGRM’s estimates of food security categories outperform those pro-
duced using the FSM scale with the 3 response rule, we can also adjust the FSM scale such that
both measures more closely match the true data. Specifically, we adjust the FSM scale’s number of
“food insecurity indicative responses” needed to classify a household as food secure until the share
of food secure and food insecure households produced by the FSM scale more closely matches
the true data. For example, with the food security threshold set to the 20th percentile, adjusting
the FSM scale to require 7 indicative responses produces shares of food secure and food insecure
households equal to roughly 77% and 23%, respectively. This same process is repeated for our
alternative thresholds and the results are then given in Table 42. Table 42 shows that adjusting the
number of responses needed in the FSM scale to mirror the data increases its performance consid-
erably. However, while the gap in performance between the BGRM and FSM scale categorizations
is smaller, the BGRM still outperforms the FSM scale in all cases. Therefore, while the vast ma-
jority of studies stick to the traditional 3 response FSM scale regardless of the sample, the BGRM
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is better able to assign households food security status in our simulated data exercise even in the
case where the scale is adjusted to match a known threshold.
3.6 Conclusion
In this study, we propose a new method for measuring household food security. Our Bayesian
Graded Response Model (BGRM) is well suited to the measurement of food security for several
reasons. First, the BGRM estimates latent food security as a continuous variable, removing the
need for discreet food security categories common to other models. Second, the BGRM allows
us to estimate food security using both binary and polytomous ordered response variables. This
flexibility lets us avoid having to first turn each core Food Security Module (FSM) question into a
binary variable before constructing our measure. Importantly, being able to utilize all data without
initial variable restrictions incorporates information about response severity at the intensive mar-
gin for non-binary questions into our estimates. Third, questions not included in the FSM can be
included in the BGRM. By adding or removing variables, researchers can evaluate different di-
mensions of food security which may not be covered by existing measures. Finally, as a Bayesian
model, the BGRM estimates draws from a posterior distribution of food security for each house-
hold. Using approximated moments of these distributions, we can provide measures of uncertainty
along with point estimates.
After presenting our model and estimation algorithm, we test our model’s performance using
a simulated data exercise. We find that our model adequately retrieves structural parameters, but
convergence is slow and potentially not achieved for our set of threshold parameters. While this
is commonly cited in the literature using similar models, improving the estimation speed of the
BGRM would likewise improve accessibility to the method and is a promising avenue for future
research. After classifying each household in our simulated data set as food secure or food inse-
cure to match the traditional scale, we then test the ability of both the BGRM and FSM scale to
accurately classify households. We show that the using the BGRM produces significantly better
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categorization accuracy than the FSM scale when using the official 3 response cutoff. Adjusting
the number of responses needed to classify a household as food insecure under the FSM to match
the simulated data reduces this gap in performance, but we still find that the BGRM outperforms
the FSM scale in all cases.
With the new measure for household food security presented in this chapter, additional work
is needed in two major areas. First, the sampling algorithm would greatly benefit from alterations
that increase its efficiency. This is especially true for researchers who may be facing more com-
putational constraints due to hardware limitations. If the model can be estimated more easily, the
method would be increasingly approachable to the target audience of food security researchers.
The second area where additional work is needed relates to estimation and evaluation of the model
using real world data. Our BGRM can be used to measure food security with any one of the major
surveys that contain the FSM. BGRM estimates of food security from real survey data could be
compared to the traditional FSM scale across several dimensions. For example, both measures
could be compared on their ability to predict outcomes we associate with a household’s level of
food security like physical and mental health. If future work finds that the BGRM out performs
the FSM scale in terms of predictive power, its advantages would be further strengthened.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Figure 1: CEP Participation Rate by Identified Student Percentage During the 2014 and 2015
School Years
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Figure 2: Average BMI Score for CEP and non-CEP schools by Years
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Figure 3: Rate of Child Underweight for CEP and non-CEP schools by Years
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Figure 4: Rate of Child Healthyweight for CEP and non-CEP schools by Years
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Figure 5: Rate of Child Overweight for CEP and non-CEP schools by Years
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Figure 6: Rate of Child Obesity for CEP and non-CEP schools by Years
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Figure 7: CEP Participation by Identified Student Percentage
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Figure 8: Mean InHFZ% by CEP Eligibility Status Across Time
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Figure 9: Mean BMI by CEP Eligibility Status Across Time
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Figure 10: Posterior Draws of µ
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Figure 11: Posterior Draws of σ2
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Figure 12: Posterior Draws of δ Mean
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Figure 13: Posterior Draws of γ2
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Figure 14: Data Generating Values of δ vs. Posterior Mean Draws of δ
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Table 2: Regressions of Child BMI Percentile on Attending a CEP Participating School
(1) (2) (3)
Child BMI Percentile Child BMI Percentile Child BMI Percentile
CEP School Attendance 1.475∗∗∗ 1.347∗∗∗ 1.216∗∗
(0.320) (0.382) (0.384)
Year Fixed Effects x x x
Child and School Covariates x x
Child Fixed Effects x
N 67,700 49,880 49,880
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the child-level. Child and school covariates
include: household below 200% FPL, single parent household, mother married at time of birth, child black, child
male, child age in months, child attends an urban school, child attends a rural school, and school’s percent of non-
white students. All sample sizes are rounded in accordance with the ECLS-K:2011 restricted-use data reporting
requirements.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3: Regressions of Child Weight Categories on Attending a CEP Participating School
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Underweight Healthy Weight Overweight Obese
CEP School Attendance 0.00165 -0.0165∗ 0.0149∗ 0.0141∗∗
(0.00375) (0.0088) (0.00803) (0.00715)
N 49,880 49,880 49,880 49,880
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the child-level. All regressions include year
fixed effects, child fixed effects, and child and school covariates. Child and school covariates include: household below
200% FPL, single parent household, mother married at time of birth, child black, child male, child age in months, child
attends an urban school, child attends a rural school, and school’s percent of non-white students. All sample sizes are
rounded in accordance with the ECLS-K:2011 restricted-use data reporting requirements.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4: Regressions of Child BMI Percentile on Attending a CEP Participating School by Gender
Panel A: Males
(1) (2) (3)
Child BMI Percentile Child BMI Percentile Child BMI Percentile
CEP School Attendance 0.794∗ 0.709 0.536
(0.45) (0.546) (0.55)
Year Fixed Effects x x x
Child and School Covariates x x
Child Fixed Effects x
N 34,740 25,670 25,670
Panel B: Females
(1) (2) (3)
Child BMI Percentile Child BMI Percentile Child BMI Percentile
CEP School Attendance 2.219∗∗∗ 2.016∗∗∗ 1.916∗∗∗
(0.455) (0.532) (0.534)
Year Fixed Effects x x x
Child and School Covariates x x
Child Fixed Effects x
N 32,960 24,220 24,220
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the child-level. Child and school covariates
include: household below 200% FPL, single parent household, mother married at time of birth, child black, child age
in months, child attends an urban school, child attends a rural school, and school’s percent of non-white students. All
sample sizes are rounded in accordance with the ECLS-K:2011 restricted-use data reporting requirements.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5: Regressions of Child Weight Categories on Attending a CEP Participating School by
Gender
Panel A: Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Underweight Healthy Weight Overweight Obese
CEP School Attendance 0.00662 -0.000432 -0.00619 0.0184∗
(0.00521) (0.0122) (0.0111) (0.0102)
N 25,670 25,670 25,670 25,670
Panel B: Females
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Underweight Healthy Weight Overweight Obese
CEP School Attendance -0.00367 -0.0332∗∗∗ 0.0369∗∗∗ 0.00909
(0.0054) (0.0127) (0.0116) (0.01)
N 24,220 24,220 24,220 24,220
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the child-level. All regressions include year
fixed effects, child fixed effects, and child and school covariates. Child and school covariates include: household
below 200% FPL, single parent household, mother married at time of birth, child black, child age in months, child
attends an urban school, child attends a rural school, and school’s percent of non-white students. All sample sizes are
rounded in accordance with the ECLS-K:2011 restricted-use data reporting requirements.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6: Regressions of Child BMI Percentile on Attending a CEP Participating School by Race
Panel A: Whites
(1) (2) (3)
Child BMI Percentile Child BMI Percentile Child BMI Percentile
CEP School Attendance 1.669∗∗∗ 1.386∗∗ 1.372∗∗
(0.544) (0.6) (0.6)
Year Fixed Effects x x x
Child and School Covariates x x
Child Fixed Effects x
N 29,950 24,130 24,130
Panel B: Non-Whites
(1) (2) (3)
Child BMI Percentile Child BMI Percentile Child BMI Percentile
CEP School Attendance 1.110∗∗∗ 1.025∗∗ 0.856∗
(0.397) (0.493) (0.497)
Year Fixed Effects x x x
Child and School Covariates x x
Child Fixed Effects x
N 37,700 25,760 25,760
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the child-level. Child and school covariates
include: household below 200% FPL, single parent household, mother married at time of birth, child male, child age
in months, child attends an urban school, child attends a rural school, and school’s percent of non-white students. All
sample sizes are rounded in accordance with the ECLS-K:2011 restricted-use data reporting requirements.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 7: Regressions of Child Weight Categories on Attending a CEP Participating School by Race
Panel A: Whites
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Underweight Healthy Weight Overweight Obese
CEP School Attendance 0.00239 -0.00282 0.000429 0.0112∗
(0.00748) (0.0145) (0.0125) (0.0111)
N 24,130 24,130 24,130 24,130
Panel B: Non-Whites
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Underweight Healthy Weight Overweight Obese
CEP School Attendance 0.000821 -0.0207∗ 0.0198∗ 0.0169∗
(0.00422) (0.0112) (0.0105) (0.0093)
N 25,760 25,760 25,760 25,760
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the child-level. All regressions include year
fixed effects, child fixed effects, and child and school covariates. Child and school covariates include: household
below 200% FPL, single parent household, mother married at time of birth, child male, child age in months, child
attends an urban school, child attends a rural school, and school’s percent of non-white students. All sample sizes are
rounded in accordance with the ECLS-K:2011 restricted-use data reporting requirements.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 8: Regressions of Child BMI Percentile on Attending a CEP Participating School by Pre-
CEP Period Household Income Level
Panel A: Household Income Below 200% FPL at Some Point During the Pre-CEP Period
(1) (2) (3)
Child BMI Percentile Child BMI Percentile Child BMI Percentile
CEP School Attendance 0.813∗ 0.78 0.671
(0.441) (0.528) (0.531)
Year Fixed Effects x x x
Child and School Covariates x x
Child Fixed Effects x
N 28,570 20,440 20,440
Panel B: Household Income Never Below 200% FPL During the Pre-CEP Period
(1) (2) (3)
Child BMI Percentile Child BMI Percentile Child BMI Percentile
CEP School Attendance 1.889∗∗∗ 1.486∗∗∗ 1.414∗∗
(0.509) (0.563) (0.565)
Year Fixed Effects x x x
Child and School Covariates x x
Child Fixed Effects x
N 34,450 29,320 29,320
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the child-level. Child and school covariates
include: household below 200% FPL, single parent household, mother married at time of birth, child male, child
black, child age in months, child attends an urban school, child attends a rural school, and school’s percent of non-
white students. All sample sizes are rounded in accordance with the ECLS-K:2011 restricted-use data reporting
requirements.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 9: Regressions of Child Weight Categories on Attending a CEP Participating School by
Pre-CEP Period Household Income Level
Panel A: Household Income Below 200% FPL at Some Point During the Pre-CEP Period
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Underweight Healthy Weight Overweight Obese
CEP School Attendance 0.00311 -0.0165 0.0134 0.0101
(0.00493) (0.0121) (0.0112) (0.0103)
N 20,440 20,440 20,440 20,440
Panel B: Household Income Never Below 200% FPL During the Pre-CEP Period
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Underweight Healthy Weight Overweight Obese
CEP School Attendance 0.000631 -0.00574 0.0051 0.0135
(0.00585) (0.0132) (0.0118) (0.00986)
N 29,320 29,320 29,320 29,320
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the child-level. All regressions include year
fixed effects, child fixed effects, and child and school covariates. Child and school covariates include: household below
200% FPL, single parent household, mother married at time of birth, child male, child black, child age in months, child
attends an urban school, child attends a rural school, and school’s percent of non-white students. All sample sizes are
rounded in accordance with the ECLS-K:2011 restricted-use data reporting requirements.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 10: Regressions of Child BMI Percentile on Attending a CEP Participating School by Region
(1) (2) (3) (4)
West Midwest South Northeast
CEP School Attendance 1.778 1.09 1.266∗∗ 0.147
(1.24) (0.761) (0.523) (1.177)
N 13,130 9,490 19,570 7,710
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the child-level. All regressions include year
fixed effects, child fixed effects, and child and school covariates. Child and school covariates include: household below
200% FPL, single parent household, mother married at time of birth, child black, child male, child age in months, child
attends an urban school, child attends a rural school, and school’s percent of non-white students. All sample sizes are
rounded in accordance with the ECLS-K:2011 restricted-use data reporting requirements.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 11: Regressions of Underweight on Attending a CEP Participating School by Region
(1) (2) (3) (4)
West Midwest South Northeast
CEP School Attendance 0.0169 0.00206 0.00493 -0.0125
(0.0131) (0.00776) (0.00463) (0.0135)
N 13,130 9,490 19,570 7,710
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the child-level. All regressions include year
fixed effects, child fixed effects, and child and school covariates. Child and school covariates include: household below
200% FPL, single parent household, mother married at time of birth, child black, child male, child age in months, child
attends an urban school, child attends a rural school, and school’s percent of non-white students. All sample sizes are
rounded in accordance with the ECLS-K:2011 restricted-use data reporting requirements.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 12: Regressions of Healthy Weight on Attending a CEP Participating School by Region
(1) (2) (3) (4)
West Midwest South Northeast
CEP School Attendance -0.0439∗ -0.0174 -0.0282∗∗ 0.0585∗∗
(0.0252) (0.0185) (0.0123) (0.0255)
N 13,130 9,490 19,570 7,710
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the child-level. All regressions include year
fixed effects, child fixed effects, and child and school covariates. Child and school covariates include: household below
200% FPL, single parent household, mother married at time of birth, child black, child male, child age in months, child
attends an urban school, child attends a rural school, and school’s percent of non-white students. All sample sizes are
rounded in accordance with the ECLS-K:2011 restricted-use data reporting requirements.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 13: Regressions of Overweight on Attending a CEP Participating School by Region
(1) (2) (3) (4)
West Midwest South Northeast
CEP School Attendance 0.027 0.0153 0.0232∗∗ -0.046∗∗
(0.0224) (0.0168) (0.0115) (0.0221)
N 13,130 9,490 19,570 7,710
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the child-level. All regressions include year
fixed effects, child fixed effects, and child and school covariates. Child and school covariates include: household below
200% FPL, single parent household, mother married at time of birth, child black, child male, child age in months, child
attends an urban school, child attends a rural school, and school’s percent of non-white students. All sample sizes are
rounded in accordance with the ECLS-K:2011 restricted-use data reporting requirements.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 14: Regressions of Obese on Attending a CEP Participating School by Region
(1) (2) (3) (4)
West Midwest South Northeast
CEP School Attendance 0.0169 0.00871 0.0151 0.00751
(0.0131) (0.0143) (0.0102) (0.0211)
N 13,130 9,490 19,570 7,710
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the child-level. All regressions include year
fixed effects, child fixed effects, and child and school covariates. Child and school covariates include: household below
200% FPL, single parent household, mother married at time of birth, child black, child male, child age in months, child
attends an urban school, child attends a rural school, and school’s percent of non-white students. All sample sizes are
rounded in accordance with the ECLS-K:2011 restricted-use data reporting requirements.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 15: Regressions of Child BMI Percentile on Attending a CEP Participating School for Chil-
dren in CEP Non-Pilot States
(1) (2) (3)
Child BMI Percentile Child BMI Percentile Child BMI Percentile
CEP School Attendance 1.7∗∗∗ 1.791∗∗∗ 1.556∗∗∗
(0.384) (0.456) (0.459)
Year Fixed Effects x x x
Child and School Covariates x x
Child Fixed Effects x
N 51,660 38,010 38,010
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the child-level. Child and school covariates
include: household below 200% FPL, single parent household, mother married at time of birth, child black, child
male, child age in months, child attends an urban school, child attends a rural school, and school’s percent of non-
white students. All sample sizes are rounded in accordance with the ECLS-K:2011 restricted-use data reporting
requirements.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 16: Regressions of Child Weight Categories on Attending a CEP Participating School for
Children in CEP Non-Pilot States
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Underweight Healthy Weight Overweight Obese
CEP School Attendance 0.00286 -0.0197∗ 0.0168∗ 0.0245∗∗∗
(0.00429) (0.0104) (0.00962) (0.00825)
N 38,010 38,010 38,010 38,010
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the child-level. All regressions include year
fixed effects, child fixed effects, and child and school covariates. Child and school covariates include: household below
200% FPL, single parent household, mother married at time of birth, child black, child male, child age in months, child
attends an urban school, child attends a rural school, and school’s percent of non-white students. All sample sizes are
rounded in accordance with the ECLS-K:2011 restricted-use data reporting requirements.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 17: Regressions of Child BMI Percentile on Attending a CEP Participating School for Chil-
dren who Attended One School During the Sample Period
(1) (2) (3)
Child BMI Percentile Child BMI Percentile Child BMI Percentile
CEP School Attendance 1.829∗∗∗ 1.638∗∗∗ 1.483∗∗∗
(0.396) (0.465) (0.468)
Year Fixed Effects x x x
Child and School Covariates x x
Child Fixed Effects x
N 48,810 36,320 36,320
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the child-level. Child and school covariates
include: household below 200% FPL, single parent household, mother married at time of birth, child black, child
male, child age in months, child attends an urban school, child attends a rural school, and school’s percent of non-
white students. All sample sizes are rounded in accordance with the ECLS-K:2011 restricted-use data reporting
requirements.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 18: Regressions of Child Weight Categories on Attending a CEP Participating School for
Children who Attended One School During the Sample Period
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Underweight Healthy Weight Overweight Obese
CEP School Attendance 0.00129 -0.0228∗∗ 0.0215∗∗ 0.0187∗∗
(0.00476) (0.0106) (0.00964) (0.00884)
N 36,320 36,320 36,320 36,320
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the child-level. All regressions include year
fixed effects, child fixed effects, and child and school covariates. Child and school covariates include: household below
200% FPL, single parent household, mother married at time of birth, child black, child male, child age in months, child
attends an urban school, child attends a rural school, and school’s percent of non-white students. All sample sizes are
rounded in accordance with the ECLS-K:2011 restricted-use data reporting requirements.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 19: Regressions of Child BMI Percentile on Attending a CEP Participating School for Chil-
dren in the Restricted ISP Sub-Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Child BMI Percentile Child BMI Percentile Child BMI Percentile
CEP School Attendance 1.057∗∗ 0.985∗ 0.993∗
(0.479) (0.56) (0.564)
Year Fixed Effects x x x
Child and School Covariates x x
Child Fixed Effects x
N 35,520 26,020 26,020
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the child-level. Child and school covariates
include: household below 200% FPL, single parent household, mother married at time of birth, child black, child
male, child age in months, child attends an urban school, child attends a rural school, and school’s percent of non-
white students. All sample sizes are rounded in accordance with the ECLS-K:2011 restricted-use data reporting
requirements.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 20: Regressions of Child Weight Categories on Attending a CEP Participating School for
Children in the Restricted ISP Sub-Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Underweight Healthy Weight Overweight Obese
CEP School Attendance 0.00929 -0.0253∗ 0.016 0.00405
(0.00608) (0.0136) (0.0124) (0.00974)
N 26,020 26,020 26,020 26,020
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the child-level. All regressions include year
fixed effects, child fixed effects, and child and school covariates. Child and school covariates include: household below
200% FPL, single parent household, mother married at time of birth, child black, child male, child age in months, child
attends an urban school, child attends a rural school, and school’s percent of non-white students. All sample sizes are
rounded in accordance with the ECLS-K:2011 restricted-use data reporting requirements.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 21: Regressions of Child BMI Percentile on Attending a CEP Participating School for Chil-
dren in the Minimum Bias Due to Self-Selection on Unobservables Sub-Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Child BMI Percentile Child BMI Percentile Child BMI Percentile
CEP School Attendance 1.312∗∗∗ 1.597∗∗ 1.416∗∗
(0.509) (0.629) (0.638)
Year Fixed Effects x x x
Child and School Covariates x x
Child Fixed Effects x
N 19,600 13,270 13,270
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the child-level. Child and school covariates
include: household below 200% FPL, single parent household, mother married at time of birth, child black, child
male, child age in months, child attends an urban school, child attends a rural school, and school’s percent of non-
white students. All sample sizes are rounded in accordance with the ECLS-K:2011 restricted-use data reporting
requirements.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 22: Regressions of Child Weight Categories on Attending a CEP Participating School for
Children in the Minimum Bias Due to Self-Selection on Unobservables Sub-Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Underweight Healthy Weight Overweight Obese
CEP School Attendance 0.0071 -0.0198 0.0127 0.0199
(0.0057) (0.0138) (0.0127) (0.0122)
N 13,270 13,270 13,270 13,270
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the child-level. All regressions include year
fixed effects, child fixed effects, and child and school covariates. Child and school covariates include: household below
200% FPL, single parent household, mother married at time of birth, child black, child male, child age in months, child
attends an urban school, child attends a rural school, and school’s percent of non-white students. All sample sizes are
rounded in accordance with the ECLS-K:2011 restricted-use data reporting requirements.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 23: Regression of Child BMI Percentile on Attending a CEP Participating School Instru-
mented for Using Binary Eligibility and ISP Interactions
Panel A: Binary Eligibility
(1)
Child BMI Percentile
CEP School Attendance 6.596∗∗∗
(1.419)
N 40,390
Panel B: ISP Interactions
(1)
Child BMI Percentile
CEP School Attendance 4.070∗∗∗
(0.984)
N 40,130
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the child-level. All regressions include year
fixed effects, child fixed effects, and child and school covariates. Child and school covariates include: household below
200% FPL, single parent household, mother married at time of birth, child black, child male, child age in months, child
attends an urban school, child attends a rural school, and school’s percent of non-white students. All sample sizes are
rounded in accordance with the ECLS-K:2011 restricted-use data reporting requirements.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 24: Regressions of Child Weight Categories on Attending a CEP Participating School In-
strumented for Using Binary Eligibility and ISP Interactions
Panel A: Binary Eligibility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Underweight Healthy Weight Overweight Obese
CEP School Attendance 0.00236 -0.0973∗∗∗ 0.0949∗∗∗ 0.0618∗∗
(0.0139) (0.0338) (0.031) (0.0252)
N 40,390 40,390 40,390 40,390
Panel B: ISP Interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Underweight Healthy Weight Overweight Obese
CEP School Attendance -0.00588 -0.0485∗∗ 0.0544∗∗ 0.0471∗∗
(0.00838) (0.0229) (0.0214) (0.0187)
N 40,130 40,130 40,130 40,130
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the child-level. All regressions include year
fixed effects, child fixed effects, and child and school covariates. Child and school covariates include: household below
200% FPL, single parent household, mother married at time of birth, child black, child male, child age in months, child
attends an urban school, child attends a rural school, and school’s percent of non-white students. All sample sizes are
rounded in accordance with the ECLS-K:2011 restricted-use data reporting requirements.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 25: Variable Summary Statistics 2011-2016
Mean StD Min Max Count
Percent Students In Healthy Fitness Zone 58.88 10.51 1.47 92.08 8797
Mean Body Mass Index Score 20.35 2.27 14.97 27.25 8797
Percent Free and Reduced Price Lunches 63.02 26.27 5 100 8797
Ever CEP Eligible .472 .4992 0 1 8797
Ever CEP Participating .2687 .4433 0 1 8797
Number of Students 866.08 476.37 75 4192 8797
Percent Black Students 33.37 27.90 0 100 8797
Percent White Students 46.44 28.47 0 99 8797
Percent Migrant Students .3066 1.325 0 24 8797
Percent Special Education Students 10.95 3.4 0 30 8797
Percent ESL Students 5.63 9.70 0 79 8797
Percent Gifted Students 10.71 8.41 .1 74.3 8797
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Table 26: Regressions of Child Weight Categories on Attending a CEP Participating School In-
strumented for Using Binary Eligibility and ISP Interactions
Panel A: First Stage Regression of CEP Participation on binary CEP Eligibility
All Schools Elementary
Schools
Middle
Schools
High Schools
CEP Elig 0.466∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.525∗∗∗ 0.605∗∗∗
(0.0128) (0.0141) (0.0293) (0.0459)
F-stat 1,327.90 869.49 322.34 173.72
N 7430 4716 1533 1167
Panel B: First Stage Regression of CEP Participation on ISP Interaction Instruments
All Schools Elementary
Schools
Middle
Schools
High Schools
(100-ISP) ∗ CEP Elig 0.0602∗∗∗ 0.0579∗∗∗ 0.0670∗∗∗ 0.0647∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0019) (0.003) (0.0028)
(100-ISP) ∗ CEP Elig 2 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.0011∗∗∗ −0.0011∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
F-stat 1,783.29 1,078.1 514.13 385.55
N 7406 4711 1533 1162
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. CEP Eligible is an indicator of CEP eligibility for a given school
in a given year. ISP represents a school’s identified student percentage in a given year. Control variables include
percent black students, percent white students, percent migrant students, percent special education students, percent
ESL students, and percent gifted students. All regressions include year and school fixed effects. Regressions are
weighted by student population in 2014.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 27: Second Stage Binary CEP Eligibility IV Estimates of CEP Participation Effects on
Weight Outcomes by School Grade Type
Panel A: IV Estimated Effects of CEP Participation on Percentage of Healthy Weight Stu-
dents
All Schools Elementary
Schools
Middle Schools High Schools
CEP Participation 0.0181∗∗∗ 0.0098 0.0225 0.0014
(0.0066) (0.0072) (0.016) (0.0142)
N 7416 4716 1533 1167
Panel B: IV Estimated Effects of CEP Participation on average BMI
All Schools Elementary
Schools
Middle Schools High Schools
CEP Participation −0.197∗∗∗ −0.201∗∗ −0.0424 −0.147
(0.0562) (0.0816) (0.0896) (0.118)
N 7416 4730 1533 1168
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. CEP participation is an indicator of enrollment in the CEP for a given
school in a given year instrumented for using binary CEP eligibility. Control variables include percent black students,
percent white students, percent migrant students, percent special education students, percent ESL students, and percent
gifted students. All regressions include year and school fixed effects. Regressions are weighted by student population
in 2014.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 28: Second Stage Identified Student Percentage Interaction IV Estimates of CEP Participa-
tion Effects on Weight Outcomes by School Grade Type
Panel A: IV Estimated Effects of CEP Participation on Percentage of Healthy Weight Stu-
dents
All Schools Elementary
Schools
Middle Schools High Schools
CEP Participation 0.0127∗∗∗ 0.0047 0.0229∗∗ −0.0049
(0.0048) (0.0052) (0.0109) (0.0123)
N 7406 4711 1533 1162
Panel B: IV Estimated Effects of CEP Participation on average BMI
All Schools Elementary
Schools
Middle Schools High Schools
CEP Participation −0.0997∗∗ −0.0551 −0.13∗ −0.0195
(0.0443) (0.0598) (0.0759) (0.102)
N 7406 4711 1533 1162
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. CEP participation is an indicator of enrollment in the CEP for a given
school in a given year instrumented for using ISP interaction terms. Control variables include percent black students,
percent white students, percent migrant students, percent special education students, percent ESL students, and percent
gifted students. All regressions include year and school fixed effects. Regressions are weighted by student population
in 2014.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 29: First Stage Estimates by School Location Type
Panel A: First Stage Regression of CEP Participation on binary CEP Eligibility
Urban Rural Suburbs/Towns
CEP Eligible 0.731∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗
(0.0467) (0.0324) (0.0277)
F-stat 421.7 508.07 470.43
N 851 3145 3434
Panel B: First Stage Regression of CEP Participation on ISP Interaction Instruments
Urban Rural Suburbs/Towns
(100-ISP) ∗ CEP Eligible 0.0649∗∗∗ 0.0625∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.0025) (0.0024)
(100-ISP) ∗ CEP Eligible 2 −0.0011∗∗∗ −0.0011∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
F-stat 728.16 738.64 567.88
N 834 3141 3431
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. CEP Eligible is an indicator of CEP eligibility for a given school
in a given year. ISP represents a school’s identified student percentage in a given year. Control variables include
percent black students, percent white students, percent migrant students, percent special education students, percent
ESL students, and percent gifted students. All regressions include year and school fixed effects. Regressions are
weighted by student population in 2014.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 30: Second Stage Binary CEP Eligibility IV Estimates of CEP Participation Effects on
Weight Outcomes by School Location Type
Panel A: IV Estimated Effects of CEP Participation on Percentage of Healthy Weight Stu-
dents
Urban Rural Suburbs/Towns
CEP Participation 0.0254∗ 0.0194∗ 0.0156
(0.0134) (0.0099) (0.012)
N 840 3142 3434
Panel B: IV Estimated Effects of CEP Participation on average BMI
Urban Rural Suburbs/Towns
CEP Participation −0.0106 −0.164∗ −0.28∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.085) (0.101)
N 840 3142 3434
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. CEP participation is an indicator of enrollment in the CEP for a given
school in a given year instrumented for using binary CEP eligibility. Control variables include percent black students,
percent white students, percent migrant students, percent special education students, percent ESL students, and percent
gifted students. All regressions include year and school fixed effects. Regressions are weighted by student population
in 2014.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 31: Second Stage Identified Student Percentage Interaction IV Estimates of CEP Participa-
tion Effects on Weight Outcomes by School Location Type
Panel A: IV Estimated Effects of CEP Participation on Percentage of Healthy Weight Stu-
dents
Urban Rural Suburbs/Towns
CEP Participation 0.0364∗∗∗ 0.0159∗∗ 0.0037
(0.0116) (0.0066) (0.0084)
N 834 3141 3431
Panel B: IV Estimated Effects of CEP Participation on average BMI
Urban Rural Suburbs/Towns
CEP Participation −0.0256 −0.0859 −0.11
(0.102) (0.0613) (0.0731)
N 834 3141 3431
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. CEP participation is an indicator of enrollment in the CEP for a given
school in a given year instrumented for using ISP interaction terms. Control variables include percent black students,
percent white students, percent migrant students, percent special education students, percent ESL students, and percent
gifted students. All regressions include year and school fixed effects. Regressions are weighted by student population
in 2014.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 32: Pre-CEP Period Falsification Test by School Grade Type
Panel A: Regression of Percentage of Healthy Weight Students on False CEP eligibility in
2012
All Schools Elementary
Schools
Middle Schools High Schools
False CEP Eligibility −0.0025 −0.0049 −0.0047 −0.0027
(0.0026) (0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0046)
N 2936 1869 608 459
Panel B: Regression of Average BMI on False CEP Eligibility in 2012
All Schools Elementary
Schools
Middle Schools High Schools
False CEP Eligibility −0.023 0.0626 0.0313 0.0406
(0.0365) (0.0484) (0.0629) (0.0636)
N 2936 1869 608 459
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. False CEP eligibility status is an indicator assigned to schools in 2012
which are CEP eligible after the program’s implementation. Control variables include percent black students, percent
white students, percent migrant students, percent special education students, percent ESL students, and percent gifted
students. All regressions include year and school fixed effects. Regressions are weighted by student population in
2014.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 33: First Stage Estimates by School Grade Type with 2013
Panel A: First Stage Regression of CEP Participation on binary CEP Eligibility
All Schools Elementary
Schools
Middle
Schools
High Schools
CEP Eligible 0.427∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗
(0.0197) (0.0223) (0.0442) (0.0635)
F-stat 1,340.83 836.57 343.23 198.24
N 8804 5608 1824 1372
Panel B: First Stage Regression of CEP Participation on ISP Interaction Instruments
All Schools Elementary
Schools
Middle
Schools
High Schools
(100-ISP) ∗ CEP Eligible 0.0595∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.0655∗∗∗ 0.0657∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0035) (0.0029)
(100-ISP) ∗ CEP Eligible 2 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.0011∗∗∗ −0.0011∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
F-stat 1,771.02 1,046.03 525.14 406.86
N 8794 5603 1824 1367
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. CEP Eligible is an indicator of CEP eligibility for a given school in a
given year. ISP represents a school’s identified student percentage in a given year. Schools are assigned the same CEP
eligibility status, ISP, and CEP participation status in 2013 as 2014. Control variables include percent black students,
percent white students, percent migrant students, percent special education students, percent ESL students, and percent
gifted students. All regressions include year and school fixed effects. Regressions are weighted by student population
in 2014.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 34: First Stage Estimates by School Location Type with 2013
Panel A: First Stage Regression of CEP Participation on binary CEP Eligibility
Urban Rural Suburbs/Towns
CEP Eligible 0.697∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗
(0.0536) (0.0325) (0.0271)
F-stat 421.7 508.07 470.43
N 983 3735 4086
Panel B: First Stage Regression of CEP Participation on ISP Interaction Instruments
Urban Rural Suburbs/Towns
(100-ISP) ∗ CEP Eligible 0.0666∗∗∗ 0.0623∗∗∗ 0.0547∗∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0025) (0.0026)
(100-ISP) ∗ CEP Eligible 2 −0.0012∗∗∗ −0.0011∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
F-stat 713.86 755.17 564.16
N 977 3734 4083
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. CEP Eligible is an indicator of CEP eligibility for a given school in a
given year. ISP represents a school’s identified student percentage in a given year. Schools are assigned the same CEP
eligibility status, ISP, and CEP participation status in 2013 as 2014. Control variables include percent black students,
percent white students, percent migrant students, percent special education students, percent ESL students, and percent
gifted students. All regressions include year and school fixed effects. Regressions are weighted by student population
in 2014.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 35: Second Stage Binary CEP Eligibility IV Estimates of CEP Participation Effects on
Weight Outcomes by School Grade Type with 2013
Panel A: IV Estimated Effects of CEP Participation on Percentage of Healthy Weight Stu-
dents
All Schools Elementary
Schools
Middle Schools High Schools
CEP Participation 0.0149∗∗ 0.0071 0.0157 0.0023
(0.0074) (0.0074) (0.018) (0.0141)
N 8791 5596 1824 1371
Panel B: IV Estimated Effects of CEP Participation on average BMI
All Schools Elementary
Schools
Middle Schools High Schools
CEP Participation −0.176∗∗∗ −0.184∗∗ −0.0126 −0.177
(0.0562) (0.0811) (0.0898) (0.116)
N 8804 5608 1824 1372
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. CEP participation is an indicator of enrollment in the CEP for a
given school in a given year instrumented for using binary CEP eligibility. Schools are assigned the same CEP
eligibility status and CEP participation status in 2013 as 2014. Control variables include percent black students,
percent white students, percent migrant students, percent special education students, percent ESL students, and percent
gifted students. All regressions include year and school fixed effects. Regressions are weighted by student population
in 2014.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 36: Second Stage Binary CEP Eligibility IV Estimates of CEP Participation Effects on
Weight Outcomes by School Location Type with 2013
Panel A: IV Estimated Effects of CEP Participation on Percentage of Healthy Weight Stu-
dents
Urban Rural Suburbs/Towns
CEP Participation 0.0301∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.0031
(0.015) (0.0106) (0.0131)
N 983 3735 4086
Panel B: IV Estimated Effects of CEP Participation on average BMI
Urban Rural Suburbs/Towns
CEP Participation −0.003 −0.173∗∗ −0.223∗∗
(0.114) (0.086) (0.101)
N 973 3732 4086
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. CEP participation is an indicator of enrollment in the CEP for a
given school in a given year instrumented for using binary CEP eligibility. Schools are assigned the same CEP
eligibility status and CEP participation status in 2013 as 2014. Control variables include percent black students,
percent white students, percent migrant students, percent special education students, percent ESL students, and percent
gifted students. All regressions include year and school fixed effects. Regressions are weighted by student population
in 2014.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 37: Second Stage Identified Student Percentage Interaction IV Estimates of CEP Participa-
tion Effects on Weight Outcomes by School Grade Type with 2013
Panel A: IV Estimated Effects of CEP Participation on Percentage of Healthy Weight Stu-
dents
All Schools Elementary
Schools
Middle Schools High Schools
CEP Participation 0.0109∗∗ 0.0024 0.0128 −0.001
(0.0049) (0.0051) (0.0117) (0.0115)
N 8794 5603 1824 1367
Panel B: IV Estimated Effects of CEP Participation on average BMI
All Schools Elementary
Schools
Middle Schools High Schools
CEP Participation −0.0767∗ −0.0352 −0.104 −0.0109
(0.0418) (0.0567) (0.0733) (0.0926)
N 8781 5591 1824 1366
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. CEP participation is an indicator of enrollment in the CEP for a
given school in a given year instrumented for using ISP interaction terms. Schools are assigned the same CEP eligi-
bility status and CEP participation status in 2013 as 2014. Control variables include percent black students, percent
white students, percent migrant students, percent special education students, percent ESL students, and percent gifted
students. All regressions include year and school fixed effects. Regressions are weighted by student population in
2014.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 38: Second Stage Identified Student Percentage Interaction IV Estimates of CEP Participa-
tion Effects on Weight Outcomes by School Location Type with 2013
Panel A: IV Estimated Effects of CEP Participation on Percentage of Healthy Weight Stu-
dents
Urban Rural Suburbs/Towns
CEP Participation 0.0425∗∗∗ 0.0187∗∗∗ −0.0021
(0.0124) (0.0066) (0.0084)
N 977 3734 4083
Panel B: IV Estimated Effects of CEP Participation on average BMI
Urban Rural Suburbs/Towns
CEP Participation −0.023 −0.0487 −0.0916
(0.0954) (0.0578) (0.0703)
N 967 3731 4083
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. CEP participation is an indicator of enrollment in the CEP for a
given school in a given year instrumented for using ISP interaction terms. Schools are assigned the same CEP eligi-
bility status and CEP participation status in 2013 as 2014. Control variables include percent black students, percent
white students, percent migrant students, percent special education students, percent ESL students, and percent gifted
students. All regressions include year and school fixed effects. Regressions are weighted by student population in
2014.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 39: Simulated Data Exercise Data Generating Parameters
j µ σ2 γ2
1 1 0.5 1.5
2 1 0.5 1.5
3 1 0.5 1.5
4 1 0.5 ∞
5 1 0.5 1.5
6 1 0.5 ∞
7 1 0.5 ∞
8 1 0.5 ∞
9 1 0.5 ∞
10 1 0.5 1.5
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Table 40: Simulated Data Exercise Data Generating Parameters vs. Posterior Means and 95%
Credible Intervals
j µ µ̂ σ2 σ̂2 γ2 γ̂2
1 1 1.011 0.5 0.485 1.5 1.479
(0.972,1.054) (0.443,0.529) (1.449,1.505)
2 1 0.987 0.5 0.5 1.5 1.482
(0.946,1.028) (0.459,0.544) (1.455,1.510)
3 1 0.971 0.5 0.471 1.5 1.43
(0.93,1.012) (0.431,0.514) (1.395,1.455)
4 1 1.005 0.5 0.459 ∞ NE
(0.954,1.056) (0.398,0.524)
5 1 1.01 0.5 0.543 1.5 1.483
(0.968,1.05) (0.494,0.589) (1.464,1.501)
6 1 0.97 0.5 0.451 ∞ NE
(0.922,1.021) (0.39,0.517)
7 1 0.984 0.5 0.419 ∞ NE
(0.936,1.038) (0.363,0.49)
8 1 1.013 0.5 0.495 ∞ NE
(0.96,1.066) (0.426,0.57)
9 1 1.011 0.5 0.513 ∞ NE
(0.96,1.065) (0.444,0.591)
10 1 1.028 0.5 0.510 1.5 1.54
(0.985,1.07) (0.467,0.554) (1.505,1.572)
123
Table 41: Food Security Categorization Accuracy of BGRM and FSM Scale
Panel A: Food Insecurity Defined as δ below the 20th Percentile
Proper Match Rate Mismatch Rate
BGRM 0.9412 0.0588
FSM Scale 0.5194 0.4806
Panel B: Food Insecurity Defined as δ below the 50th Percentile
Proper Match Rate Mismatch Rate
BGRM 0.9076 0.0924
FSM Scale 0.8078 0.1922
Panel C: Food Insecurity Defined as δ below the 5th Percentile
Proper Match Rate Mismatch Rate
BGRM 0.9724 0.0276
FSM Scale 0.3694 0.6306
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Table 42: Food Security Categorization Accuracy of BGRM and Adjusted FSM Scale
Panel A: Food Insecurity Defined as δ below the 20th Percentile
Proper Match Rate Mismatch Rate
BGRM 0.9412 0.0588
FSM Scale 0.9158 0.0842
Panel B: Food Insecurity Defined as δ below the 50th Percentile
Proper Match Rate Mismatch Rate
BGRM 0.9076 0.0924
FSM Scale 0.8810 0.1190
Panel C: Food Insecurity Defined as δ below the 5th Percentile
Proper Match Rate Mismatch Rate
BGRM 0.9724 0.0276
FSM Scale 0.9654 0.0346
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